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ABSTRACT 
 Special weapon and tactics (SWAT) teams and public safety bomb squads 
(PSBSs) need to better collaborate to effectively and efficiently respond to the joint 
hazards that the United States faces. After-action reports, as in the case of the 1999 
Columbine High School attack in Littleton, Colorado, and the 2016 Pulse nightclub 
massacre in Orlando, Florida, highlight the need for PSBS to address integration and 
better collaboration with SWAT teams before an actual critical incident. Such 
collaboration between SWAT and PSBS might seem easy in theory, but challenges exist. 
Evaluating those challenges through the lens of trust, this thesis finds that cultivating trust 
between the two different disciplines requires socialization and frequent joint hazard 
training. Such barriers as independence of training and frequency of common missions, 
unit organization, and culture can inhibit SWAT and PSBS from collaborating, 
developing trust, and discovering collective weaknesses before a critical incident occurs. 
The ultimate goal, in practical terms, is the formation of cross-functional teams (CFTs). 
This thesis concludes by giving specific examples of boundary-spanning activities for 
SWAT and PSBS to foster the CFT approach, so that a better collaborative effort can 
emerge, thereby encouraging trust between SWAT and PSBS that will be beneficial in a 
critical joint hazard incident. 
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On the morning of April 20, 1999, two Columbine High School students in 
Littleton, Colorado, attacked their school with firearms and explosives.1 The rampage 
lasted an hour, and the shooters, Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, ultimately killed 12 
students and one teacher. Before committing suicide, the shooters placed multiple 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) throughout the school. When SWAT teams entered 
the school, they were effectively stopped by the threat of the IEDs.2 The local PSBSs on 
the scene, already aware of the presence of IEDs, were not integrated with the special 
weapons and tactics (SWAT) teams that entered the high school. Had bomb technicians 
been deployed with SWAT, they could have guided SWAT around the IEDs and more 
quickly rescued the students and faculty still inside the school. According to a case study 
published by Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, Columbine established the 
importance of cultivating a collaborative effort between law enforcement tactical teams 
and bomb experts for a joint response.3 The collaboration problem between SWAT and 
PSBS resurfaced 20 years later in Orlando, Florida. The after-action report for the Pulse 
nightclub massacre criticized SWAT and bomb squad integration, just as the report for 
Columbine did. 
This thesis asks how special weapons and tactics teams and bomb squads can better 
integrate to prepare for and respond to joint hazard responses, such as active shooter and 
domestic terrorist events where guns and bombs are present. This thesis hypothesizes that 
mutual trust between SWAT teams and public safety bomb squads (PSBSs) is largely and 
fatefully absent, especially in response to such critical incidents as domestic terrorism, 
where both disciplines are needed. Role ambiguity, minimal relationships, and a shortage 
 
1 John R. Cashman, “The Massacre at Columbine High School,” in Emergency Response Handbook 
for Chemical and Biological Agents and Weapons, 2nd ed. (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2008), 45–58, 
https://doi.org/10.1201/9781420052664. 
2 Susan Rosegrant, “The Shootings at Columbine High School: Responding to a New Kind of 




of time spent working together can cause a lack of trust. This thesis explores the value of 
trust and its role in collaborative organizational efforts in crisis-response teams, 
specifically SWAT units and PSBSs. 
Both the National Tactical Officers Association (NTOA) and the National Bomb 
Squad Commanders Advisory Board (NBSCAB) note the desirability for SWAT and PSBS 
to collaborate their response to complex joint hazards, such as domestic terrorism and 
active shooter incidents.4 However, neither NTOA nor NBSCAB outline how to 
collaborate. A collaborative gap persists, yet SWAT and PSBS remain mostly 
unconnected, which begs the question of what exactly hinders integration. This thesis 
evaluates how to achieve that integration and examines the value of trust in a crisis with a 
focus on its distinct role in crisis response and management.  
The comparison of SWAT and PSBS shows that there is often insufficient time for 
trust to develop between the two disciplines—all the more so if they are unfamiliar with 
each other in the first place. First of all, SWAT teams are individually trained, and this 
training widely varies, while PSBS are centrally trained at a single school that serves the 
entire nation. Because SWAT and PSBS do not train together initially, a SWAT operator’s 
or bomb technician’s career might not concentrate on integrated response operations. 
Furthermore, the equipment for SWAT and PSBS is dissimilar enough to cause integration 
problems, as traditional PSBS equipment is too bulky for SWAT applications. Also, SWAT 
and PSBS spend most of their training time focused on the missions they most commonly 
undertake—serving high-risk warrants versus recovering explosives and responding to 
suspicious packages, respectively. Aggravating the problem is the diffusion of SWAT 
teams in relation to PSBSs nationally, which five times more SWAT teams than PSBSs. 
Furthermore, differences in personality, group culture, and narratives promote distrust, 
 
4 National Tactical Officers Association, Tactical Response and Operations Standards for Law 
Enforcement Agencies (Colorado Springs: National Tactical Officers Association, 2018); National Bomb 
Squad Commanders Advisory Board, National Guidelines for Bomb Technicians (Washington, DC: 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2016). 
xvii 
which also hinders effective collaboration and integration. These factors promote what 
Warren Street calls “norms of non-involvement,” a failure or refusal to collaborate.5  
A critical examination of trust has been well studied and researched, yet its role in 
emergency response is still in its infancy. The author’s research concludes that trust is 
indeed a vital component of crisis response. Even though it has been largely overlooked in 
practice, recent research suggests its potential value to first responders in how collaboration 
works or fails. Tangible components of trust include clarity of roles, knowledge transfer, 
and communication, but they are prone to distortion and distrust. The concept of a cross-
functional team can, thus, apply to better integrating SWAT and PSBS. Such teams, 
composed of small groups from diverse specialized areas of an organization or profession, 
are boundary spanners.6 A lack of boundary work and awareness, suggests Anderson, 
results in a “silo mentality,” yet a better understanding of boundary lines “is important in 
enhancing organizational resilience.”7 If SWAT and PSBS had a clearer understanding of 
boundary-spanning tasks, they might have broken from the siloed response approach at 
Columbine.  
This thesis presents actionable recommendations that can help socialize and 
cultivate mutual trust between SWAT and PSBS to improve their collaborative potential. 
By focusing on boundary-spanning activities, SWAT and PSBS can develop better 
boundary awareness and mutual trust. Five joint training examples are outlined in this 
thesis: robotic operation, explosive breaching, booby trap awareness, suicide bomber 
response, and special event planning and operations. Together, these activities constitute 
the major boundary-spanning activities between SWAT and PSBS that will help develop 
trust and collaboration before a crisis demands it. Confidence building, problem solving, 
and better role clarity and knowledge transfer will surely benefit. The reward is an 
 
5 Warren R. Street, “Brainstorming by Individuals, Coaching and Interacting Groups,” Journal of 
Applied Psychology 59, no. 4 (1974): 433–36, https://doi.org/10.1037/h0037273. 
6 Sheila Simsarian Webber, “Leadership and Trust Facilitating Cross-Functional Team Success,” 
Journal of Management Development 21, no. 3 (2002): 201–14, https://doi.org/10.1108/
02621710210420273. 
7 Annika Andersson, “In Case of Emergency: Collaboration Exercises at the Boundaries between 
Emergency Service Organizations” (PhD diss., University West, 2016), 98, http://hv.diva-portal.org/smash/
get/diva2:924967/FULLTEXT01.pdf. 
xviii 
increased overall response capability for both SWAT and PSBS. Hopefully, this thesis will 
build an interdependent relationship between the two specialties, better able to flourish in 
the threat environment this nation finds itself. Future research can explore whether the 
boundary-spanning activities presented in this thesis help cultivate trust and improve the 
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This thesis explores the question: How can special weapons and tactics teams and 
bomb squads better integrate to prepare for and respond to domestic terrorist events?  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Although more commonly seen on distant battlefields in the ongoing war on terror, 
the combination of guns and bombs took center stage at an American high school on April 
20, 1999, in Littleton, Colorado. To be sure, the Columbine High School shooting in 1999 
changed law enforcement in several ways.1 First, radio communication systems, long an 
Achilles heel of emergency response, eventually improved with newer interoperable radio 
systems used by multiple jurisdictions and agencies. No longer would first responders be 
frustrated by their inability to openly talk to other first responders from other agencies 
without significant problems. As technology caught up with demand, newer radios capable 
of supporting numerous frequencies became the standard.  
Second, and more significantly, no longer would patrol officers and deputies wait 
for special weapons and tactics (SWAT) to arrive before initiating tactical action to reduce 
active threats.2 At Columbine, 12 students and one teacher were killed during the rampage 
while law enforcement more or less waited outside for hours.3 Rather than establishing a 
perimeter, staging resources, and standing by for SWAT to arrive, law enforcement 
agencies after Columbine embraced active-shooter training for all officers, designed to stop 
the killing as soon as possible.4 The 2018 shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High 
 
1 Susan Rosegrant, “The Shootings at Columbine High School: Responding to a New Kind of 
Terrorism: Sequel,” C16-01-1612.1 (Cambridge, MA: Kennedy School of Government, Harvard 
University, 2001).  
2 Rosegrant, 4. 
3 Rosegrant. 
4 Rosegrant, 7. 
2 
School formed a stark reminder of the perils of not immediately acting to stop the threat.5 
Active shooter training today remains part of basic police training in most jurisdictions. 
A third lesson that has again emerged more recently is the concept of cross-
functional collaboration between SWAT and public safety bomb squad (PSBSs) in 
response to joint hazards.6 At Columbine, SWAT and PSBS were forced to integrate, and 
the results were mixed, not least because the two organizations had not coordinated before.  
1. Columbine: A Study in Delay 
Tuesday, April 20, 1999, began ominously in metropolitan Denver. At 1122 hours, 
a road crew working three miles southwest of Columbine High School found two bags on 
the shoulder and tossed them aside, thinking they were trash.7 Workers were startled when 
a small fire started after one of the bags of trash, casually tossed, exploded. Dylan Klebold 
and Eric Harris had placed improvised explosive devices (IEDs) inside the trash bags 
alongside the road as a diversion, their intent to draw emergency responders away from 
Columbine High School.8  
At 1123 hours, the attack at Columbine High School began. Klebold and Harris, 
both seniors at the school, roamed the hallways, systematically shooting students and 
teachers alike. The first officer on the scene, a deputy sheriff from Jefferson County, 
exchanged gunfire with both Klebold and Harris, and the shooters retreated inside the 
school.9  
 
5 Audra D. S. Burch and Alan Blinder, “Parkland Officer Who Stayed Outside during Shooting Faces 
Criminal Charges,” New York Times, June 4, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/04/us/parkland-scot-
peterson.html. At Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School, 17 students and faculty were killed and another 
17 injured. The school resource officer present during the attack did not immediately engage the active 
threat, which is widely attributed to the high death count that day.  
6 Rosegrant, “The Shootings at Columbine High School,” 8. 
7 John R. Cashman, “The Massacre at Columbine High School,” in Emergency Response Handbook 
for Chemical and Biological Agents and Weapons, 2nd ed. (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2008), 45–58, 
https://doi.org/10.1201/9781420052664; U.S. Fire Administration, Wanton Violence at Columbine High 
School: Littleton, Colorado, USFA-TR-12 (Emmitsburg, MD: Department of Homeland Security, 1999), 
https://www.usfa.fema.gov/downloads/pdf/publications/tr-128.pdf.  
8 U.S. Fire Administration, Wanton Violence at Columbine High School, 9.  
9 Cashman, “The Massacre at Columbine High School,” 50–51. 
3 
The attackers carried bags containing anti-personnel IEDs as they moved around 
the school, placing them in specific areas to cause more casualties on detonation.10 
Hallways, classrooms, the library, and the cafeteria were littered with IEDs. Klebold and 
Harris moved throughout the library and adjacent hallways shooting victims. They also lit 
and threw numerous pipe bombs. They tossed more pipe bombs into the cafeteria from an 
upper stairway—while some 488 students cowered beneath tables in fear.11 Some IEDs 
detonated, while others were left unexploded.  
In all, the attackers brought nearly 100 hazardous devices to the school that day. 
John Cashman notes five IEDs exploded in the library, six detonated in the hallways and 
classrooms, and six more exploded in the cafeteria.12 Unexploded IEDs also littered the 
school. On the outside property of the school, thirteen IEDs were found, including one on 
the roof. The attackers’ cars held an additional thirty, including two IEDs that were 
considered car bombs. Inside the library, twenty-six IEDs were deposited. The hallways 
and classrooms revealed fourteen more IEDs, and the cafeteria held four. Some IEDs were 
even taped on doors, suggesting other risks were present, such as booby traps and 
tripwires.13 
In addition, the attackers had left multiple improvised incendiary devices (IIDs), 
including “two twenty-gallon propane tanks . . . [filled] with white gas, kerosene.”14 
Molotov cocktails containing homemade napalm, and other gasoline-fueled IIDs, were 
placed throughout the school. Around 1205 hours, the attackers committed suicide inside 
the library after detonating one of the 20-gallon propane tanks in the cafeteria. This 
explosion activated the school’s fire sprinkler system.15  
 
10 U.S. Fire Administration, Wanton Violence at Columbine High School, 12. 
11 Cashman, “The Massacre at Columbine High School,” 53.  
12 Cashman, “The Massacre at Columbine High School,” 45; U.S. Fire Administration, Wanton 
Violence at Columbine High School, 10. 
13 U.S. Fire Administration, Wanton Violence at Columbine High School, 12.  
14 Cashman, “The Massacre at Columbine High School,” 45.  
15 U.S. Fire Administration, Wanton Violence at Columbine High School, 14.  
4 
Law enforcement waited outside for the arrival of SWAT while the killings 
commenced inside. SWAT deployed inside, around 1220 hours, and met immediately with 
exploded and unexploded devices, smoke, and the activated fire and sprinkler systems. The 
presence of the IEDs, as reported by the U.S. Fire Administration, stopped SWAT’s 
momentum, as it was “concerned about the obvious presence of explosive and incendiary 
devices.”16 Thus, at 1457 hours, students were still inside the school, and no one knew their 
condition. The reality was that the scene could not be made safe until all IEDs were secured. 
Finally, at 1600 hours, two PSBS technicians entered the school under SWAT cover 
to evaluate the numerous IEDs inside the school.17 Neither PSBS technician had a 
bulletproof vest, although one donned a full bomb suit, which weighed close to 80 
pounds.18 Such bomb suits are heavy and bulky, making the wearer too slow and too 
inflexible to be used in fast-paced SWAT missions. On the one hand, Klebold and Harris’s 
plans for a major explosive aspect to their attack failed when so many of their devices failed 
to detonate. On the other hand, the proliferation of devices—amid an untrained and 
unintegrated response—significantly delayed rescue efforts. 
2. Collaboration: Learned and Unlearned 
Susan Rosegrant underscores the importance of involving PSBS personnel early on 
in tactical decisions when IEDs and other hazardous devices are present.19 If, suggests 
Rosegrant, bomb technicians had deployed with SWAT elements inside the school in 
Columbine, they could have told SWAT that the IEDs “posed no risk as long as they were 
not moved.”20 In other words, bomb technicians could have assessed each crude device, 
rendered the device safe, or guided SWAT around each obstacle to reach the victims 
scattered throughout the school. Similarly, the U.S. Fire Administration report on 
Columbine claims that “it would have been a great benefit if the SWAT teams, EOD 
 
16 U.S. Fire Administration, 21. 
17 U.S. Fire Administration, 26.  
18 “EOD 10 Suit & Helmet,” Med-Eng Holdings, accessed February 22, 2020, https://www.med-eng.
com/product/eod-10-suit-helmet/. 
19 Rosegrant, “The Shootings at Columbine High School,” 8.  
20 Rosegrant. 
5 
[explosive ordnance disposal] technicians, and fire/EMS [emergency medical service] 
personnel at Columbine had been able to train in joint operations.”21  
Even though some lessons learned from Columbine were eventually implemented, 
the lesson of collaboration was largely neglected.22 This inattention was noted even a very 
short time after Columbine by the City of Arvada’s (near Littleton) then-police chief: 
“There still wasn’t enough opportunities to interact. . . . Everybody’s busy, everybody’s 
got staffing constraints.”23 This observation makes sense. Time, staffing, and budgets are 
limited resources. Turnover in personnel reduces the collective memory, and relationships 
begin to suffer. 
The collaboration problem between SWAT and PSBS resurfaced 20 years later in 
Orlando, Florida. The after-action report for the Pulse nightclub massacre criticized SWAT 
and PSBS integration, just as the report for Columbine did.24 A collaborative gap persists, 
yet SWAT and PSBS remain mostly unconnected, which begs the question of what exactly 
hinders integration. Fundamental differences in training, mission response, and 
organization and a lack of knowledge all play a role in limiting meaningful integration 
between SWAT and PSBS. Furthermore, differences in personality and group narratives 
promote distrust, which hinders effective collaboration and integration.  
Both the National Tactical Officers Association (NTOA) and the National Bomb 
Squad Commanders Advisory Board (NBSCAB) note the desirability for SWAT and PSBS 
to integrate their response to complex joint hazards, such as domestic terrorism incidents.25 
However, neither NTOA nor NBSCAB outline how to achieve that desired integration. 
The threats are universal—explosives are used by terrorists and criminals alike throughout 
 
21 U.S. Fire Administration, Wanton Violence at Columbine High School, 31. 
22 Rosegrant, “The Shootings at Columbine High School,” 8. 
23 Rosegrant, 7.  
24 Frank Straub et al., Rescue, Response, and Resilience: A Critical Incident Review of the Orlando 
Public Safety Response to the Attack on the Pulse Nightclub (Washington DC: Office of Community 
Oriented Police Services, 2017), 74, https://cops.usdoj.gov/RIC/Publications/cops-w0857-pub.pdf. 
25 National Tactical Officers Association, Tactical Response and Operations Standards for Law 
Enforcement Agencies (Colorado Springs: National Tactical Officers Association, 2018); National Bomb 
Squad Commanders Advisory Board, National Guidelines for Bomb Technicians (Washington, DC: 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2016). 
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the world. Such law enforcement tactical units as SWAT are on the frontlines of this threat. 
Moreover, PSBSs have the knowledge, skills, and equipment that SWAT lacks in dealing 
with IEDs, booby traps, and other chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive 
(CBRNE) threats. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
During a joint hazard response—for example, a domestic terrorist event—not only 
must members of diverse disciplines interact with each other, but they also must do so 
under high-stress conditions. Too often, unfamiliar agencies, groups, and expertise come 
together only for (and amid) an immediate or demanding need.26 At the moment of crisis, 
organizations must accept their vulnerabilities and ultimately depend on each other.27 
Acceptance often comes with incomplete information on the capabilities and intentions of 
the different disciplines involved.28 Skepticism and wariness, assert Lewicki, McAllister, 
and Bies, can then prevail, promoting distrust and limiting integration’s potential.29 Thus, 
the lack of familiarity and suspicion during high-stakes events exacerbate the stress. 
This literature review looks at the unique value of trust as well as its elusive 
definition, development, role in organizational outcomes, and relation to effective 
collaboration. Regarding the challenges of integrating SWAT and PSBS, trust may need to 
be of a particular kind for the teams to collaborate successfully in a crisis. 
 
26 Steven Curnin et al., “A Theoretical Framework for Negotiating the Path of Emergency 
Management Multi-Agency Coordination,” Applied Ergonomics 47 (March 2015): 300–307, https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.apergo.2014.10.014. 
27 Annika Andersson, “In Case of Emergency: Collaboration Exercises at the Boundaries between 
Emergency Service Organizations” (PhD diss., University West, 2016), 27, http://hv.diva-portal.org/smash/
get/diva2:924967/FULLTEXT01.pdf. 
28 Pierre Courtois and Tarik Tazdaït, “Learning to Trust Strangers: An Evolutionary Perspective,” 
Journal of Evolutionary Economics 22, no. 2 (April 2012): 367, 377, http://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-011-
0247-z. 
29 Roy J. Lewicki, Daniel J. McAllister, and Robert J. Bies, “Trust and Distrust: New Relationships 
and Realities,” Academy of Management Review 23, no. 3 (July 1998): 445, https://doi.org/10.5465/AMR.
1998.926620. 
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1. The Common Denominator: Trust 
In an exploratory study by Amy Donahue and Robert Tuohy, such problems in 
incident response as communication, leadership, logistics, planning, resource management, 
public relations, and training stand out; these are called command problems.30 The common 
denominator, the authors suggest, is a lack of trust.31  
In a broader look at improving collaboration, Hocevar, Jansen, and Thomas discuss 
nine crucial domains in integration to discover “ways to overcome . . . barriers and work 
together more effectively.”32 A workshop involving homeland security professionals 
spanning federal, state, and local agencies formed the basis of their report. In one exercise, 
attendees were asked to think of a successful event that required collaboration between two 
agencies or organizations, as well as two events that were unsuccessful.33 Analysis of the 
workshop shows that successful factors include the desire to collaborate to reach a common 
goal.34 Conversely, the most cited barrier to collaboration was a lack of trust, followed by 
inhibiting attitudes and a lack of familiarity. Dirks and Ferrin agree with Hocevar, Jansen, 
and Thomas. They argue that trust is paramount to the success or failure of collaboration.35 
Trust can benefit partnerships, but the lack of trust can destroy them.  
2. Trust: An Elusive Definition? 
Despite this consensus, researchers disagree about the form and definition of trust 
itself. Indeed, Diego Gambetta suggests that the because the meaning of trust is “elusive,” 
 
30 Amy K. Donahue and Robert V. Tuohy, “Lessons We Don’t Learn: A Study of the Lessons of 
Disasters, Why We Repeat Them, and How We Can Learn Them,” Homeland Security Affairs 2, no. 2 
(July 2006): 1–28. 
31 Donahue and Tuohy. 
32 Susan Hocevar, Erik Jansen, and Gail Fann Thomas, Building Collaborative Capacity for Homeland 
Security, NPS-GSBPP-04-008 (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2004), http://hdl.handle.net/
10945/571. 
33 Hocevar, Jansen, and Thomas, 2.  
34 Hocevar, Jansen, and Thomas, 15. 
35 Kirk T. Dirks and Donald L. Ferrin, “The Role of Trust in Organizational Settings,” Organization 
Science 12, no. 4 (August 2001): 450–67. 
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the word is overused and misunderstood.36 Trust is studied, explain Das and Teng, in 
“psychology, philosophy, sociology, economics and organization theory.”37 Consequently, 
finding commonality in trust’s nominal value across different professions proves 
difficult.38 However, a definite interest in the study of trust and its value persists. One side 
perceives that trust has a diminished value in society. Nevertheless, another side sees a 
significantly rising demand for trust in relationships and societal organizations.39 Thus, the 
consensus of what trust is and what value it holds varies from one organization to another. 
Trust has many definitions. For example, Rotter defines trust as an expectation that 
one will honor his word and be reliable.40 Conversely, Schlenker, Helm, and Tedeschi 
suggest trust relies on the word of another involved in an ambiguous and risky enterprise.41 
In yet another take, Sitkin and Roth conceive trust as referring to competence—the ability 
to perform a specific task under a particular circumstance.42 Yet, Mayer, Davis, and 
Schoorman add that “trust is the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of 
another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action.”43 
Each one of these definitions shows trust in a different light. 
 
36 Diego Gambetta, ed., forward to Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations (Cambridge, 
MA: Basil Blackwell, 1988), https://www.nuffield.ox.ac.uk/users/gambetta/Trust_making%20and%20
breaking%20cooperative%20relations.pdf.  
37 T. K. Das and Bing-Sheng Teng, “The Risk-Based View of Trust: A Conceptual Framework,” 
Journal of Business and Psychology 19, no. 1 (Fall 2004): 85–116, https://doi.org/10.1023/B:JOBU.
0000040274.23551.1b. 
38 Roy J. Lewicki and Barbara Benedict Bunker, “Developing and Maintaining Trust in Work 
Relationships,” in Trust in Organizations: Frontiers of Theory and Research, ed. Roderick M. Kramer and 
Tom R. Tyler (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 1996), 114–39, http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/
9781452243610.n7. 
39 Roderick M. Kramer and Tom R. Tyler, ed., Trust in Organizations: Frontiers of Theory and 
Research (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 1996).  
40 Julian B. Rotter, “A New Scale for the Measurement of Interpersonal Trust,” Journal of Personality 
35, no. 4 (December 1967): 651–65, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6494.1967.tb01454.x. 
41 Barry R. Schlenker, Bob Helm, and James T. Tedeschi, “The Effects of Personality and Situational 
Variables on Behavioral Trust,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 25, no. 3 (March 1973): 
419–27, https://doi.org/10.1037/h0034088. 
42 Sim B. Sitkin and Nancy L. Roth, “Explaining the Limited Effectiveness of Legalistic ‘Remedies’ 
for Trust/Distrust,” Organization Science 4, no. 3 (August 1993): 367–92, https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.
4.3.367. 
43 Roger C. Mayer, James H. Davis, and F. David Schoorman, “An Integrative Model of 
Organizational Trust,” Academy of Management Review 20, no. 3 (July 1995): 712, https://doi.org/10.5465/
AMR.1995.9508080335. 
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Even though one definition of trust is not universally accepted, scholars generally 
agree about the helpfulness of trust. Townley and Garfield maintain the importance of trust 
cannot be overstated, yet modern society lacks a good grasp of trust because it takes many 
forms.44 For example, Rousseau et al. examined the various definitions of trust and better-
defined the concept in terms of organizational science.45 In their work, trust promotes 
adaptive organizational relationships, reduces harmful conflict, encourages the 
collaboration of ad hoc working teams, and promotes a better response to a crisis. Based 
on those outcomes, Rousseau et al. coin a definition of trust better suited to crisis response: 
“Trust is a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon 
positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another.”46 This definition of trust 
also helps to explain hurdles to integration as well.  
Two aspects of the aforementioned definition need explaining in relation to crisis 
response and hurdles to integration. First, accepting one’s vulnerability is difficult to do 
because it involves taking a risk. If one had complete certainty about an incident or event, 
trust would be unnecessary. The condition of vulnerability concurs with Mayer, Davis, and 
Schoorman’s definition of submitting oneself to the actions of another.47 The second 
condition is interdependence, meaning a goal cannot be accomplished without the 
involvement of another party. As Rousseau et al. suggest, both risk and interdependence 
must be present for trust to emerge fully.48 Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman also agree.49 The 
definitions presented above show that trust, rather than being elusive, has truly tangible 
substance.  
 
44 Cynthia Townley and Jay L. Garfield, “Public Trust,” in Trust: Analytic and Applied Perspectives, 
ed. Pekka Mäkelä and Cynthia Townley (Amsterdam: Brill, 2013), vii–viii, ProQuest. 
45 Denise Rousseau et al., “Not So Different After All: A Cross-Discipline View of Trust,” Academy of 
Management Review 23, no. 3 (July 1998): 393–404, https://doi.org/10.5465/AMR.1998.926617. 
46 Rousseau et al., 395. 
47 Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman, “Integrative Model of Organizational Trust,” 716.  
48 Rousseau et al., “Not So Different After All,” 395.  
49 Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman, “Integrative Model of Organizational Trust,” 715, 725–26.  
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3. Components of Trust Development 
Scholars offer slightly different models of trust development. Stephen M. R. Covey 
suggests that trust is not some elusive—Covey uses the term illusive—or soft quality, as 
stated by Diego Gambetta.50 Instead, he believes, “Trust is a pragmatic, tangible, actionable 
asset that you create.”51 Covey suggests four factors facilitate the emergence and 
development of trust: intent, integrity, results, and capability.52 Trust is made by character 
and competence. Not only is a person’s integrity and intent important (character), but their 
ability and results (competence) are also vital; words and deeds must align.53 To create 
trust, one must begin by first addressing self-trust and then building good character and 
competence. By focusing on Covey’s components of trust, one can begin to nurture 
competence and credibility, the underpinning for sustained trust.54 Thus, in Covey’s model, 
trust develops from a person’s character and competence.  
Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman offer a more dynamic model than Covey does—an 
integrative model of organizational trust. As Figure 1 shows, the factors of trustworthiness 
are ability, benevolence, and integrity in this model.55 
 
50 Stephen M. R. Covey, The Speed of Trust: The One Thing That Changes Everything (New York: 
Free Press, 2006), 2; Diego Gambetta, “Can We Trust Trust?,” in Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative 
Relations, ed. Diego Gambetta (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1988), https://www.nuffield.ox.ac.uk/
users/gambetta/Trust_making%20and%20breaking%20cooperative%20relations.pdf. 
51 Covey, The Speed of Trust, 2. 
52 Covey, 29–31. 
53 Covey. 
54 Covey, 30. 
55 Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman, “Integrative Model of Organizational Trust,” 714–20. 
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Figure 1. Integrative Model of Organizational Trust56 
Ability, much like Covey’s capability factor, includes skills and competencies in this 
model.57 According to Mayer, Davis and Schoorman, “Benevolence is the extent to which 
a trustee is believed to want to do good,” a definition similar to Covey’s element of intent.58 
Integrity, again identical to Covey’s model, is the relationship between one’s actions and 
another’s expectations. The model then diverges from Covey’s with the propensity to trust 
(a stabilizer) and a perceived risk to overcome (a variable). The incorporation of a feedback 
loop in this model makes it distinctly different from Covey’s, calling attention to the 
“dynamic nature of trust.”59 Trust, thus, becomes a fluid endeavor that deserves constant 
attention.  
 
56 Source: Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman, “Integrative Model of Organizational Trust,” 715. 
57 Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman, “Integrative Model of Organizational Trust,” 728. 
58 Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman, 718. 
59 Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman, 728.  
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4. Trust in Organizations: Outcome, Precursor, or Moderator of 
Collaboration?  
Trust leads to higher levels of cooperation and better team processes and 
performance.60 Dirks and Ferrin opine that trust increases the likelihood of accepting risk 
and interdependence rather than results from these two factors.61 Trust also becomes a 
moderator, enhancing the conditions in which collaboration can develop further.62 Dirks 
and Ferrin found that trust moderates group processes, motivators, and outcomes.63 For 
example, de Drue and Van Vianen propose that trust can prevent disagreements from 
turning into conflict.64 Trust is, undoubtedly, a central component in the routine activities 
of organizational life. However, the salience of trust is even more prominent during times 
of crisis because the need to depend on others is often greater.65 Webb states, a crisis is an 
amplifying catalyst, “a magnifying loci for the enhancement or dissolution of trust.”66 
Webb further explains that the “consequences of winning or losing . . . [go] up,” and so 
does appreciation or resentment given the outcome.67 Thus, a crisis has the potential to 
destroy an organizational relationship if trust is low.  
In a crisis, first responders often deal with each other more in terms of roles and 
tasks than personality.68 The concept of swift trust extends to role-based trust. Swift trust 
 
60 Richard J. Klimoski and Barbara L. Karol, “The Impact of Trust on Creative Problem Solving 
Groups,” Journal of Applied Psychology 61, no. 5 (October 1976): 630–33, https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-
9010.61.5.630. 
61 Dirks and Ferrin, “The Role of Trust in Organizational Settings,” 450–52. 
62 Dirks and Ferrin, 455. 
63 Dirks and Ferrin, 457. 
64 Carsten K. W. de Dreu and Annelies E. M. Van Vianen, “Managing Relationship Conflict and the 
Effectiveness of Organizational Teams,” Journal of Organizational Behavior 22, no. 3 (May 2001): 310. 
65 Eugene J. Webb, “Trust and Crisis,” in Trust in Organizations: Frontiers of Theory and Research, 
ed. Robert M. Kramer and Tom R. Tyler (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 1996), 4–5, https://doi.
org/10.4135/9781452243610. 
66 Webb, 5. 
67 Webb. 
68 Steven Curnin et al., “Role Clarity, Swift Trust and Multi‐Agency Coordination,” Journal of 
Contingencies and Crisis Management 23, no. 1 (2015): 31–33, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5973.12072; 
Nicola Power, “Extreme Teams: Toward a Greater Understanding of Multiagency Teamwork during Major 
Emergencies and Disasters,” American Psychologist 73, no. 4 (2018): 481, https://doi.org/10.1037/amp
0000248.  
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also focuses on functions and actions rather than personal relationships, but as Curnin et 
al. explain, swift trust can be helpful when there is no time to develop a trusting 
relationship, such as during critical incident response.69 The concept of swift trust, thus, 
can manage “issues of vulnerability, uncertainty, risk, and expectations” when unfamiliar 
groups or disciplines are forced to integrate during a complex crisis that might be short in 
duration.70 Swift trust can be useful when a relationship does not exist between groups 
forced to collaborate.  
However, scholars contend that three factors hamper role-based and swift trust. In 
Curnin et al. and Zolin’s view, role ambiguity hinders trust in groups engaged in a 
coordinated mission, caused by a lack of knowledge about a supporting unit’s training, 
capabilities, and operational tempo.71 Yet role clarity is vital in role-based and swift trust.72 
A person (or group) must clearly understand his (or its) particular task and role to perform 
in crisis situations. A lack of knowledge inhibits collaboration, and as Nicola Power adds, 
teams that exhibit role ambiguity usually operate in silos, thus decreasing cooperation.73 
Second, Zolin suggests that team members familiar with each other, for instance, from a 
close-knit community, are more likely to have commonalties, which increase the 
propensity to trust.74 Thus, to her, a lack of personal connection reduces trust. Also, role-
based trust or swift trust alone does not allow the power of influence to affect a situation. 
Because it is temporary in nature and breadth, swift trust, according to Stephen Draper, 
“can be lost at the slightest appearance of incompetence.”75 Role-based trust and swift trust 
do not produce lasting relationships necessary for teams that repeatedly interact in crises.  
 
69 Curnin et al., “Role Clarity, Swift Trust,” 29–35.  
70 Peder Hyllengren et al., “Trust at First Sight: Swift Trust in Leaders in Temporary Military Groups,” 
Team Performance Management 17, no. 7/8 (2011): 355, https://doi.org/10.1108/13527591111182625. 
71 Curnin et al., “Role Clarity, Swift Trust,” 31–33; Roxanne Zolin, “Swift Trust in Hastily Formed 
Networks” (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2002), 4, http://hdl.handle.net/10945/36757.  
72 Curnin et al., “Role Clarity, Swift Trust”; Zolin, “Swift Trust.” 
73 Power, “Extreme Teams,” 483. 
74 Zolin, “Swift Trust,” 4. 
75 Stephen R. Draper, “‘EOD, Up!’ How Explosive Ordnance Disposal Forces Can Best Support 
Special Operations Forces” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2006), 66, http://hdl.handle.net/
10945/2758. 
14 
5. Trust Development within Relationships 
Like a relationship, trust best develops over time, measured in small steps at first.76 
Lewicki, Tomlinson, and Gillespie examined the development of trust, suggesting that 
relationships mature over time with frequency, duration, and challenges faced together.77 
Levin and Cross studied the correlation of knowledge transfer in developing trust. The 
authors have assessed knowledge transfer as “a critical mechanism” in trustworthiness 
because it acts as a mediator.78 Furthermore, Wilson et al. explain that knowledge transfer 
is synonymous with role clarity and can strengthen the ability to “coordinate implicitly 
rather than explicitly.”79 To be sure, effective knowledge transfer takes time. Supporting 
this idea, Rousseau et al. argue that repeated interactions among people, groups, and 
disciplines begin the development of a more stable form of trust, relationship-based trust. 
Thus, trust develops from within the relationship instead of being forced by a hectic and 
hazardous event.80 Trust then has a better chance of survival and stability.  
Building a stable relationship is difficult. For several reasons, relationships might 
not develop: the parties involved may lack time to invest in establishing a connection and 
developing trust, or as Lewicki and Bunker explain, they “have no desire for a closer 
relationship.”81 If the latter is the case, then personalities and value differences might play 
a role in the development of distrust.82 Differences in personalities and values can be 
 
76 Glenn Kautt, “How to Build Trust,” Financial Planning 45, no. 3 (2015): 29, ProQuest. 
77 Roy J. Lewicki, Edward C. Tomlinson, and Nicole Gillespie, “Models of Interpersonal Trust 
Development: Theoretical Approaches, Empirical Evidence, and Future Directions,” Journal of 
Management 32, no. 6 (2006): 991–1022, https://doi.org/10.1177/0149206306294405. 
78 Daniel Z. Levin and Rob Cross, “The Strength of Weak Ties You Can Trust: The Mediating Role of 
Trust in Effective Knowledge Transfer,” Management Science 50, no. 11 (2004): 1477–90, https://doi.org/
10.1287/mnsc.1030.0136. 
79 Katherine A. Wilson et al., “Errors in the Heat of Battle: Taking a Closer Look at Shared Cognition 
Breakdowns through Teamwork,” Human Factors 49, no. 2 (2007): 250, https://doi.org/10.1518/
001872007X312478. 
80 Rousseau et al., “Not So Different After All,” 399.  
81 Lewicki and Bunker, “Developing and Maintaining Trust,” 9. 
82 Schlenker, Helm, and Tedeschi, “Effects of Personality and Situational Variables”; Sheila Simsarian 
Webber, “Leadership and Trust Facilitating Cross-Functional Team Success,” Journal of Management 
Development 21, no. 3 (2002): 201–14, https://doi.org/10.1108/02621710210420273. 
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hurdles to building trust, yet even established trust is often fragile and easily fractured.83 
However, trust is repairable with time and commitment. For example, commitment through 
group socialization, which coalesces different disciplines, can increase a team’s 
knowledge, skill set, satisfaction, and overall loyalty. Conversely, poor socialization can 
cause apprehension and uncertainty, adding to an already dim view of integration.84 Group 
members will then become “less forgiving and less cooperative,” explains Steven 
McShane, inevitably undermining the development of trust.85 Thus, the development of 
relationships, or lack thereof, can affect crisis response.  
Time becomes a key variable in the definition of trust. Lars Huemer writes, “Trust 
and time . . . have emerged as central factors enabling cooperative advantage.”86 Partha 
Dasgupta agrees with Huemer, suggesting that “for trust to be developed between 
individuals they must have repeated encounters, and they must have some memory of 
previous experiences.”87 Covey also touches on the factor of time, offering that consistent 
behavior is vital in developing trust.88 Lewicki, McAllister, and Bies maintain that trust 
and distrust “exist . . . as distinct bipolar constructs.”89 Furthermore, the time to develop 
trust is not at the moment of crisis. Wilson et al. claim that the time for team members to 
evaluate their mission is during periods of low stress.90 Andersson, explaining the concepts 
of boundary awareness, agrees with Wilson et al. that one condition for learning in 
 
83 Hocevar, Jansen, and Thomas, Building Collaborative Capacity, 15; Covey, The Speed of Trust, 
314–29.  
84 John M. Levine, Richard L. Moreland, and Hoon-Seok Choi, “Group Socialization and Newcomer 
Innovation,” in Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology: Group Processes, ed. Michael A. Hogg and R. 
Scott Tindale (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), 86–106. 
85 Steven Lattimore McShane and Mary Ann Young Von Glinow, Organizational Behavior: 
Essentials, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2009). 
86 Lars Huemer, “Creating Cooperative Advantage: The Roles of Identification, Trust, and Time,” 
Industrial Marketing Management 43, no. 4 (May 2014): 564, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.indmarman.
2014.02.011. 
87 Partha Dasgupta, “Trust as a Commodity,” in Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative 
Relationships, ed. Diego Gambetta (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 49, https://www.nuffield.ox.
ac.uk/users/gambetta/Trust_making%20and%20breaking%20cooperative%20relations.pdf. 
88 Covey, The Speed of Trust, 34.  
89 Lewicki, McAllister, and Bies, “Trust and Distrust,” 448. 
90 Wilson et al., “Errors in the Heat of Battle.” 
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emergency preparedness and response is trust.91 Trust encourages role clarity, reduces 
defensive reactions, and promotes candidness in reporting mistakes.  
C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Distrust forms one of the most fundamental barriers to integration. This thesis 
hypothesizes that mutual trust between SWAT and PSBSs is largely absent, especially in 
a collaborative response to such critical incidents as domestic terrorism. Role ambiguity, 
minimal relationships, and a shortage of time spent working together cause a lack of trust. 
This thesis explores the value of trust and its role in collaborative organizational efforts in 
crisis response teams. The project focuses on the concept of trust and its components, 
benefits, and limitations that affect collaboration during critical incident response 
involving SWAT and PSBS. 
Multiple sources provided subject-matter insight. This research targeted the rich 
academic literature written on trust, with an eye toward its value in collaboration. This 
study reviewed open-source after-action reports of critical incidents that required a joint 
effort of SWAT and PSBS. Formal open-source after-action reports are far superior to 
media and other accounts because personnel directly involved in those incidents provide 
the analysis. Specific research on cross-functional groups was examined along with the 
standards and policies of SWAT and PSBS. The inter-organizational collaborative capacity 
assessment model, designed by Hocevar, Jansen, and Thomas, and the integrative team 
leadership and effectiveness model, designed by Zaccaro, Heinen, and Shuffler, were 
considered for this research design. 
The training, frequent missions, and organizational structure of SWAT and PSBS 
were explored to determine their roles in developing or inhibiting trust. Trust was examined 
in terms of its formation, principal components, and limitations that affect collaborative 
ventures. Group socialization and development, especially in cross-functional teams, was 
analyzed for relevance to this thesis.  
 
91 Andersson, “In Case of Emergency,” 92, 99. 
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The author of this thesis is a 21-year career law enforcement officer with the 
Gwinnett County Police Department. Since 2008, he has been a federally certified public 
safety bomb technician with experience integrating PSBT and SWAT in joint hazard 
response. This thesis does not divulge or discuss tactics that are pivotal in keeping bomb 
technicians and tactical operators safe. Those tactics are best kept guarded for a reason. 
Ultimately, this thesis provides insight for SWAT and PSBS leaders and policymakers who 
desire better collaboration, proposing an iterative joint-training process in conjunction with 
a framework for collaboration for those leaders to consider. 
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II. DIFFERENCES 
Tactical law enforcement units—SWAT, for example—handle dangerous armed 
suspects. PSBS handles bombs. Largely, the two disciplines do not overlap because SWAT 
and PSBS are highly specialized teams that entail unique training and operations. At the 
heart of this chapter are SWAT’s and PSBS’s origins, training, frequency of missions, and 
organizational differences, which can sow distrust if a relationship has not developed 
between the two disciplines before a crisis. SWAT and PSBS may experience challenges 
with collaboration and trust for several tangible reasons. For one, categorization promotes 
dependence among members of a group, causing reluctance to include others.92 This 
chapter compares the training, missions, and organization of SWAT and PSBS, finding 
that their differences might create or exacerbate trust issues. 
A. SWAT OVERVIEW 
SWAT teams are specialized law enforcement units that are ready to rescue 
hostages, deal with barricaded gunmen, provide snipers for overwatch protection, and serve 
arrest and high-risk search warrants.93 As a tactical police unit, SWAT was conceived of 
in the 1960s as a response to the growing civil disorder and political unrest prevalent in 
major urban centers.94 As the NTOA states, “Such teams are focused on incident resolution, 
as opposed to other functions, such as investigation. Their purpose is to increase the 
likelihood of safely resolving critical incidents.”95 In other words, SWAT teams, through 
their training, tactics, and equipment, surpass the normal capabilities of law enforcement 
officers and investigators in hopes of more safely resolving critical incidents.  
 
92 Isabel R. Pinto et al., “Membership Status and Subjective Group Dynamics: Who Triggers the Black 
Sheep Effect?,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 99, no. 1 (July 2010): 109, http://dx.doi.org/
10.1037/a0018187. 
93 National Tactical Officers Association, Tactical Response and Operations Standards. 
94 Peter B. Kraskaa and Derek J. Paulsenb, “Grounded Research into U.S. Paramilitary Policing: 
Forging the Iron Fist inside the Velvet Glove,” Policing and Society 7, no. 4 (1997): 254, https://doi.org/10.
1080/10439463.1997.9964777. 
95 National Tactical Officers Association, 11. 
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By the mid-1980s, largely due to the war on drugs, SWAT teams had been formed 
in a large percentage of American state and local law enforcement agencies.96 Since the 
1990s, national associations, such as the NTOA, and other state-level tactical officer 
associations have provided guidelines in an effort to standardize SWAT components and 
operations. Every three years, the NTOA publishes Tactical Response and Operations 
Standards for Law Enforcement Agencies with the intention of not only encouraging “an 
efficient core set of concepts, principles and policies to standardize and enhance the 
delivery of tactical law enforcement services” but also preparing SWAT teams to respond 
to terrorist events.97 The desire for enhanced law enforcement capabilities meant that by 
2013, some 80 percent of all cities and towns in the United States with more than 25,000 
people had a tactical team such as SWAT, according to the Wall Street Journal.98 
Compliance with the standards set by the NTOA is voluntary and not a prerequisite 
for membership.99 Because these standards are non-binding, SWAT units vary significantly 
in personnel levels, organization, training, and equipment. Something as simple as the 
caliber of weapons or as fundamental as firearm skills, room clearance, and immediate 
action drills may differ from team to team, even in neighboring townships.100 
B. PSBS OVERVIEW 
Rendering safe IEDs is the primary mission of the 468 federally certified PSBSs 
nationwide, as of 2018.101 PSBSs, under the direction of the U.S. Army and later the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), were formed in 1971 when military explosive 
ordnance disposal (EOD) teams found themselves strained due to the Vietnam War and an 
increase in domestic terrorism–related bombings.102 They are managed from city, county, 
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98 Bruce Schneier, “The Army in Our Midst,” Wall Street Journal, August 6, 2013.  
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state, and federal law enforcement agencies and fire departments. As of 2018, 91 percent 
of PSBSs were assigned to law enforcement agencies, the rest to fire departments.103  
Operating under a congressional mandate, the FBI Hazardous Devices Operation 
Center (HDOC) provides national standards for the individual certification of public safety 
bomb technicians and accreditation for the 466 PSBSs operating within public safety 
agencies in the United States.104 Figure 2 shows the PSBSs and certified bomb technicians 
by state as of January 2018.105  
 
Figure 2. Bomb Squads and Certified Techs by State106 
 
103 National Bomb Squad Commanders Advisory Board, National Strategic Plan, 5–6. 
104 National Bomb Squad Commanders Advisory Board, National Guidelines for Bomb Technicians, 1. 
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106 Source: National Bomb Squad Commanders Advisory Board, National Strategic Plan, 9. 
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As Figure 2 shows, most PSBSs are located in the urban areas of the country. Some states, 
such as California, have 47 PSBSs and 255 bomb technicians. Other states, such as 
Montana, have only two PSBSs and 16 bomb technicians. According to the National Bomb 
Squad Commanders Advisory Board (NBSCAB), the FBI sets the “Target Staffing Levels 
(TSL), for each bomb squad . . . based on geographic area, population levels, history of 
bombing incidents, and other factors.”107 The target staffing levels present challenges in 
that many PSBSs are not readily available for the local and more numerous SWAT teams.  
The U.S. Bomb Squad program is led by NBSCAB, which comprises PSBS 
commanders from across the nation, and maintains relationships with local, state, and 
federal agencies that support PSBSs. NBSCAB has the authority to make decisions on 
guidelines and standards for the profession, encouraging effective alignment of national 
PSBS resources. NBSCAB also has a strong relationship with the International Association 
of Bomb Technicians and Investigators, a non-profit association for bomb technicians all 
over the world.108 
C. TRAINING AND POLICY 
SWAT training includes in-house agency training and a variety of state and federal 
training programs, according to David A. Klinger and Jeff Rojek.109 Private vendors and 
members of the armed forces have also played a role in SWAT training.110 In 2008, Klinger 
and Rojek observed 
a wide array of SWAT training sessions and operations; from firearms 
training on shooting ranges to scenario training at a variety of venues on the 
training side of the coin, and from search warrants to hostage incidents on 
the operations side. . . . Teams focused their training time on matters they 
believed to be closely related to the sorts of things they might encounter in 
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the field. All of the training was designed to replicate as close as possible 
what the team might face during actual operations.111  
Even though the NTOA provides certain guidelines, SWAT training is not universal, and 
the equipment from one SWAT team to another is not standardized. The frequency of 
training for SWAT is also agency-dependent, with some teams training 40 hours or more 
per month but other teams training much less.112 Moreover, as Klinger and Rojek observe, 
SWAT focuses on events it more frequently encounters.113  
The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) and the NTOA published 
their National Assessment of Critical Trends and Issues from 2009 to 2013 based on 
information from 254 law enforcement agencies with SWAT teams. Table 1 shows the 
breakdown of the SWAT teams’ policies and procedures by source. 




111 Klinger and Rojek, 11. 
112 Klinger and Rojek, 10. 
113 Klinger and Rojek, 11. 
114 Source: International Association of Chiefs of Police and National Tactical Officers Association, 
National Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Study: A National Assessment of Critical Trends and Issues 
from 2009 to 2013 (Alexandria, VA: International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2014), 11, https://ntoa.
org/pdf/swatstudy.pdf. 
Source of Policy and Procedure Percent
Own agency 85.4
State/Regional tactical officers association 41.6
Municipal or county law enforcement agency 35.5
Private Vendor 7.3
State law enforcement agency 10.6
U.S. Military 7.1
Federal law enforcement agency 5.1
Foreign military 0
National Tactical Officers Association 67.4
International Association of Chiefs of Police 20.1
Other 4.7
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As Table 1 indicates, the study found that SWAT policies and standard operating 
procedures dictating a team’s actions and tactics are developed primarily within a SWAT 
team’s agency. Tactical officer associations account for 41.6 percent to 67.4 percent of 
those policies.  
Training, policies, and procedures for PSBS are vastly different from SWAT’s. 
Every public safety bomb technician in the United States completes the FBI Hazardous 
Devices School (HDS) at Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, Alabama. Before acceptance to 
HDS, all candidates must be certified by the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration as hazardous material technicians, setting the stage for a standardized 
progression of training, starting with a good foundation in CBRNE training.  
Hazardous Devices School ensures that all public safety bomb technicians and 
PSBSs operate from the same procedure, policy, and standard.115 According to the FBI, 
HDS is home to a “sprawling 455-acre campus complete with classrooms, explosive 
ranges, and mock villages that include a train station, apartment complexes, a movie 
theater, and a strip mall.”116 HDS provides realistic training areas that mirror the American 
landscape with rural, suburban, and urban environments. Bomb technicians spend six 
weeks in basic hazardous devices school, learning about commercial, military, and 
improvised explosives, as well as basic electricity, fuses, threat assessment, and robotic 
operations. The focus of this training is to render a bomb safe. Furthermore, every three 
years, each bomb technician must return to HDS for recertification of those standards, with 
an emphasis on advanced render-safe techniques. Because the need to stay ahead of 
emerging threats is a real concern at HDS, the FBI has upgraded and expanded the 
facilities.117  
Additionally, HDS provides specialized courses for bomb technicians. These 
include vehicle-borne IED (VBIED), person-borne IED (commonly known as suicide 
bombers), advanced IED electronics, post-blast investigations, weapons of mass 
 
115 Jernigan, “Hazardous Devices School,” 14–17. 
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destruction response, and tactical bomb technician (TBT) courses. The TBT course 
instructs bomb technicians in how to operate with SWAT teams and provide IED and 
booby trap identification and mitigation for high-risk operations, such as hostage rescue.118 
The challenge with the TBT course is that each SWAT team, as previously discussed, 
operates with different tactics and procedures. Thus, the bomb technician is always the 
outsider.  
The HDOC offers a national set of guidelines for all PSBS. A Model for Bomb 
Squad Operating Procedures, although not designed to be all-inclusive, serves as the 
“recommended source for developing an SOP governing the day-to-day operations of a 
professional bomb squad,” according to the FBI.119 The operating procedures include the 
selection of bomb technicians, basic and advanced training, and equipment needs. Thanks 
to this centralized approach, starting with the HDOC and HDS, the tactics, training, and 
procedures for PSBS are standardized. The equipment from one PSBS to another is very 
similar, if not identical. Moreover, bomb technicians from one team can work quickly with 
bomb technicians from another team. Ultimately, the standard training received at HDS 
allows bomb technicians to work directly with other PSBS in a seamless fashion.120  
D. MISSIONS 
The IACP and NTOA note the difficulty in collecting and analyzing SWAT reports 
because of the differences in reporting. However, their study determined the frequency of 
missions undertaken by SWAT from a sample of agencies that included both large and 
small populations with a sizable call volume.121 Table 2, from the IACP and NTOA’s 
national assessment, organizes SWAT activations by incident type from 2009 to 2013.  
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Table 2. SWAT Activity, 2009–2013122 
 
 
As Table 2 demonstrates, the most common SWAT activity or activation during 
the years examined was for high-risk warrant services. No other activity, singular or 
combined, came close to the frequency of high-risk warrant service. Interestingly, the 
percentage of SWAT activities involving IEDs rose 17.9 percent during the years of this 
study. Notably, the frequency and type of missions that SWAT undertakes likely mirror 
SWAT’s training concentrations given the limited training time and budgetary constraints.  
Additionally, Table 3 from the same study shows that nationwide, SWAT has 
access to PSBS only 59.8 percent of the time.  
 
122 Source: International Association of Chiefs of Police and National Tactical Officers Association, 
National Special Weapons and Tactics, 19. 
Activity Percent 
Change
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2009-2013
Warrant Service (Unknown Risk) 4.07 4.03 3.46 3.82 4.15 2
Warrant Service (High Risk) 17.04 16.35 15.44 14.86 14.13 -17.1
Suicidal Individuals 1.54 1.69 1.43 1.48 1.56 1.3
Barricaded Subjects 3.42 3.33 3.4 3.68 3.47 1.5
Civil Unrest/ Crowd Control 0.26 0.31 0.41 0.31 0.34 30.8
Hostage Situations 0.61 0.51 0.48 0.41 0.51 -16.4
Hostage Rescue 0.22 0.2 0.19 0.1 0.16 -27.3
Automobile Assault 0.67 0.59 0.62 0.75 0.77 14.9
Water-borne Assault 0 0 0 0 0
Bus Assault 0.018 0.011 0.035 0.034 0.028 55.6
Train Assault 0 0 0 0 0
Building Search 5.11 4.92 4.73 5.14 5.03 -1.6
Area Search 1.24 1.42 1.24 1.51 1.42 14.5
Woodland Search 0.67 0.68 0.72 0.81 0.79 17.9
Active Shooter 0.13 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.11 -15.4
Downed Officer 0.043 0.03 0.024 0.029 0.017 -60.5
Aircraft Assault 0 0 0 0 0
IED Encounters 0.28 0.38 0.32 0.4 0.33 17.9
Incidents that Occurred During Deployment by Year
Mean of Numbers Reported by Respondents 
Who Responded (Actual and Estimate)
ACTIVATIONS by Incident Type by Year (Actual and Estimate)
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Table 3. Elements That SWAT Teams Can Access123 
 
 
The limited access SWAT has to PSBS is telling considering the latter’s integration and 
joint hazards response. These finding are important because a team’s overall capability and 
available resources affect its response options. 
The typical missions undertaken by PSBSs are directly related to the 
responsibilities listed in their national guidelines. These missions include responding to 
real or suspected IEDs. PSBSs also are responsible for the recovery and, in most cases, the 
disposal of explosives, as well as technical support to tactical units such as SWAT and 
Hazmat units. Another important job-related function is to maintain relationships with 
other state and local PSBSs, canine units that assist in detecting explosives, military EOD 
assets, and such professional associations as the International Association of Bomb 
Technicians and Investigators.124 
 
123 Source: International Association of Chiefs of Police and National Tactical Officers Association, 
National Special Weapons and Tactics, 16. 
124 National Bomb Squad Commanders Advisory Board, National Guidelines for Bomb Technicians, 4. 
Number Percent
Hostage/ Crisis Negotiator 758 87.7
Emergency Medical Support 758 87.7
Social Services 545 63.1
Animal Control 635 73.5
Precision Long Rifle Team (Sniper) 750 86.8
Bomb Technician 516 59.8
K-9 693 80.2




Elements an Agency's SWAT Team has Access to
Support Elements
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In 2018, the U.S. Bomb Data Center released a snapshot of all reported PSBS 
activity in the United States with its 2,764 interagency partners and 13,059 registered 
users.125 In 2018, PSBSs saw a total of 17,968 explosive-related incidents, including 
∑ 706 explosions 
∑ 289 bombing 
∑ 7,305 explosive recoveries  
∑ 7,404 suspicious/ unattended packages 
∑ 1,627 bomb threats 
∑ 426 hoax devices126  
Figures 3 and 4, from the 2018 Bomb Data Center’s annual report, illustrate trends 
in suspicious/unattended package response calls from 2014 to 2018. Figure 3 delineates the 
categories of explosive recoveries in 2018. 
 
Figure 3. Suspicious/Unattended Package Trends127 
 
125 U.S. Bomb Data Center, 2018 Explosives Incident Report (Redstone Arsenal, AL: U.S. Bomb Data 
Center, 2018), 1, https://www.atf.gov/file/136971/download. 
126 U.S. Bomb Data Center, 1. 
127 Source: U.S. Bomb Data Center, 2018 Explosives Incident Report, 12. 
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Figure 4. Explosive Recovery Types, 2018128 
As Figure 3 and Figure 4 illustrate, response to suspicious/unattended packages and 
recovery of explosives form the bulk of PSBS missions. In 2018, PSBS responses to 
suspicious packages rose 38 percent, and responses to bomb threats rose 32 percent.129 Like 
SWAT, PSBS tends to focus its time on training for its typical response missions.  
The other activities PSBSs routinely perform already involve integration with fire 
department hazardous material (Hazmat) teams, including responses to clandestine 
laboratories (clan labs), homemade explosive or drug labs. PSBSs are a good fit for this 
activity given their hazmat background and access to advanced personal protective and 
CBRNE detection equipment.130 Also, since the anthrax scare in 2001, PSBSs have also 
found a role assisting with the identification of unknown substances, giving rise to the term 
 
128 Source: U.S. Bomb Data Center, 2018 Explosives Incident Report, 9. 
129 U.S. Bomb Data Center, 2018 Explosives Incident Report, 1. 
130 “Bomb Tech Hazmat Training,” April 3, 2019, CBS Atlanta, video, 2:35, https://www.cbs46.com/
bomb-tech-hazmat-training/video_a673915d-876c-545d-a9bf-5700eddeed5d.html. 
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“white powder call.”131 An article in Slate reported that 50,000 “hoaxes or false alarms” 
involved first responders in the year following the anthrax letters, and more than 800 of 
these types of calls still occur nationwide every year.132 PSBSs respond with Hazmat teams 
to help with the identification and mitigation of this type of incident.  
E. ORGANIZATION  
According to the NTOA, SWAT teams are either Tier 1 teams with 26 members, 
Tier 2 teams with 19 members, or tactical response teams with 15 members.133 Table 4 
describes the types of SWAT teams as designated by the NTOA.  
Table 4. NTOA Types of SWAT Teams134 
Type Capabilities Personnel 
Tier 1: 
Combination of teams 
by MOU or single 
agency team 
All mission capable; can 
serve as a mutual aid team 
to another Tier 1 or 2 team 
26 members:  
• 1 team commander,  
• 3 team leaders,  
• 4 snipers,  
• 18 operators 
Tier 2:  
Stand-alone team; 
combination of teams 
by MOU 
All mission capable, 
except for deliberate 
hostage rescues that are 
planned; emergency 
hostage rescue only 
19 members:  
• 1 team commander,  
• 2 team leaders,  
• 4 snipers,  
• 12 operators 
Tactical response team Single or combination of capabilities 
15 members:  
• 1 team commander,  
• 2 team leaders,  
• 12 operators 
 
131 Yudhijit Bhattacharjee, “The Curse of the White Powder: How Fake Bioterrorism Attacks Became 
a Real Problem,” Slate, January 30, 2012, https://slate.com/technology/2012/01/white-powder-hoaxes-a-
trend-in-fake-terrorism.html; Darrell D. Higuchi, “Model Procedures for Responding to a Package with 
Suspicion of a Biological Threat,” International Fire Chiefs Association, October 17, 2001, https://www.
iafc.org/topics-and-tools/resources/resource/model-procedures-for-responding-to-a-package-with-
suspicion-of-a-biological-threat. 
132 Bhattacharjee, “Curse of the White Powder.” 
133 National Tactical Officers Association, Tactical Response and Operations Standards, 10. 
134 Source: National Tactical Officers Association, Tactical Response and Operations Standards, 11. 
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Again, no established organizational model exists nationwide. SWAT teams 
comprise four types of team members. They have part-time members who also have other 
duties outside the team, full-time members with other duties, full-time members with no 
additional duties, and teams made up of full-time and part-time members. SWAT teams 
may also be regional teams, with smaller agencies providing support for a fuller team.135 
SWAT officers are equipped with weapons, body armor, and other tools (e.g., cameras, 
listening devices, night vision equipment, and mechanical breaching tools) that can be 
hand-carried by team members. SWAT’s equipment, sometimes considered paramilitary, 
is suited for fast and dynamic movement when speed and time to an objective are 
important.136 
PSBSs are largely shaped by their requirements to cover both rural and densely 
populated urban areas.137 Like SWAT, PSBSs can vary from agency to agency. Only 
30 percent of all public safety bomb technicians perform PSBS duties as their full-time 
assignment. The other 70 percent consider their assignment to a PSBS as collateral duty. 
Unlike the guidelines for SWAT teams, the national PSBS guidelines specifically define a 
bomb squad. A bomb squad, or “bomb response team,” comprises two certified bomb 
technicians with a complete set of the equipment described in the national guidelines.138 
As Table 5 shows, PSBSs are then rated by the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) as Type I, II, or III based on their available personnel and equipment.  
 
135 International Association of Chiefs of Police and National Tactical Officers Association, National 
Special Weapons and Tactics, 9. 
136 Adam Dulin, “Special Weapons and Tactics Teams,” TELEMASP Bulletin 12, no. 3 (June 2005): 8–
9, ProQuest. 
137 National Bomb Squad Commanders Advisory Board, National Strategic Plan, 5. 
138 National Bomb Squad Commanders Advisory Board, National Guidelines for Bomb Technicians, 3. 
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139 Source: Federal Emergency Management Agency, Typed Resource Definitions: Law Enforcement 
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Response Teams
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handling VBIEDs
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Radio, cellular telephone 
and data transmission 
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Vehicles Same as Type II Same as Type III Bomb response 
vehicle(s)




Bomb Squad/ Explosive Team
Minimum Capabilities: Type I Type II Type III
33 
The smallest PSBS is a Type III resource with one bomb response team. Type II 
and Type I resources have two or more bomb response teams. Equipment and training 
capabilities also differentiate PSBS teams. Type I resource teams possess the training and 
equipment to operate in a CBRNE environment and render a VBIED safe with a robotic 
vehicle. According to NBSCAB, because there are only 466 nationally accredited PSBSs,  
they have responsibility, through mutual aid and task force agreements, of 
taking their training, experience, and equipment beyond the borders of their 
municipalities and jurisdictional lines to serve the entirety of the US, 
performing a specialized task that the remainder of the 19,000 law 
enforcement agencies and 30,000 fire departments cannot safely and 
effectively accomplish for themselves.140  
PSBSs rely on a variety of equipment to do their job effectively and safely, as seen 
in Table 5. Such equipment includes bomb suits, robotics, x-ray equipment, and CBRNE 
protective clothing, as well as monitoring equipment, rope rigging, demolition kits, and 
dedicated transport vessels to transport and dispose of explosives. For PSBSs, this lengthy 
list of equipment, necessary in responding to a critical incident, can be incredibly bulky. In 
other words, the type of equipment that accompanies PSBS can hamper the dynamic tempo 
of SWAT when it is needed in a joint hazard response. Carrying cumbersome equipment 
means that PSBS might hinder SWAT’s speed and flexibility during a mission, much as it 
did at Columbine High School. 
F. CONCLUSION  
PSBSs have a background in integrated joint hazard response and integrate with 
Hazmat units when dealing with unknown substances. They provide technical assistance 
in special operations, liaising with military EOD teams, explosive detection canine teams, 
and other local, state, and federal PSBSs. Historically, PSBSs have integrated with SWAT 
teams far less frequently, beginning with their initial training and even following their 
common missions and organizational structures. Research suggests such limited time spent 
working together can inhibit trust. As the Columbine incident in 1999 showed, trust cannot 
work at the moment of crisis if a relationship does not already exist.  
 
140 National Bomb Squad Commanders Advisory Board, National Strategic Plan, 5. 
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III. TRUST 
At Columbine High School, collaboration did not work at the moment of crisis 
because a relationship based on trust did not already exist. As Curnin et al. suggest, 
“Without trust, teams focus on task demands, not teamwork, reducing their effectiveness 
to meet the emerging needs during a disaster.”141 If trust relates to time, as suggested by 
Huemer, then the limited time SWAT and PSBS spend together will hinder the 
development of trust and inhibit the collaboration needed during a critical joint hazard 
event.142 If the relationship is poor or non-existing, at the moment of crisis, each group 
must accept its vulnerabilities and depend on the other group, often with incomplete 
information about the different discipline’s capabilities and intentions.143 Skepticism and 
wariness, asserts Lewicki, can then prevail, promoting distrust and limiting collaborative 
potential.144 The comparison of SWAT and PSBS in Chapter I showed that there is often 
insufficient time for trust to develop between the two disciplines—all the more so if they 
are unfamiliar with each other in the first place.  
The lack of a relationship based on trust between SWAT and PSBS—caused by 
independent training, the infrequency of day-to-day missions, and unit organization—can 
result in what Warren Street calls the “norms of non-involvement,” a failure or refusal to 
become involved. Therefore, if one is accustomed to not being involved, that inertia will 
reduce participation and commitment to developing a relationship and building trust.145 If 
norms of non-involvement are at play, then issues can arise when trust is needed most, thus 
deepening the divide between the two units, and limiting the potential to discover and 
correct weaknesses, as Klinger and Rojek explain.146  
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Conversely, Dirks and Ferrin suggest the discovery of those weaknesses can help 
develop the very trust that is needed. Making those discoveries requires time and 
commitment, however.147 Stephen Draper, too, underscores that for tactical operators and 
bomb technicians, working together “requires an exceptional amount of trust in the best of 
circumstances.”148 Dirks and Ferrin further argue that trust can be measured through 
tangible and appreciable means by focusing on specific characteristics that lead to 
increased levels of performance, competency, and capability. Mishra explains that relying 
on one’s competence does affect trust.149 Moreover, trust allows units to take risks through 
decisions, and in situations of ambiguity and uncertainty, trust supports the development 
of interdependence. A lack of trust, however, reduces the range of potential actionable 
solutions. Therefore, the reliance on familiarity alone prevents the investment needed for 
trust to work.150  
This chapter examines the types of trust most often seen in crisis response. At 
Columbine, one type of trust was used between SWAT and PSBS. At Pulse nightclub, 
another type of trust was seen. Both types of trust had limitations that caused collaboration 
problems. A component of identification-based trust—yet another type—has the potential 
to enable fuller collaboration between SWAT and PSBS. Furthermore, this chapter unpacks 
the impediments to trust and promoters of trust, concluding with an examination of the 
specific role trust plays in crisis response.  
A. TYPES OF TRUST IN CRISIS RESPONSE 
Levels of organizational trust already exist in crisis response, with varying degrees 
of success. Researchers generally agree that there are three types of trust.151 Although 
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carrying different names, the three types fall into categories of calculus-based, knowledge-
based, and identification-based trust. Each type of trust has a role in crisis response, and 
each has certain limitations. This section examines each type of trust for its applicability in 
collaboration between SWAT and PSBS. 
1. Calculus-Based Trust 
Columbine can be viewed as an exercise in and failure of calculus-based trust. The 
limitations of calculus-based trust were seen in the relationship and coordination of SWAT 
and PSBS at Columbine High School on April 20, 1999. This form of trust depends on the 
reputation of an individual or group alone. Calculus-based trust is also known as swift trust, 
an idea coined by Debra Weick, and Kramer, who compare it to a “one-night stand”—
groups working together to accomplish a complex task in a finite time, without formal 
coordination and control.152 Roxanne Zolin further explains that these tasks are critical and 
often occur without notice.153 Within these parameters, Michael Fahy offers, “Swift trust 
appears to have applicability to emergency responders facing interagency incidents 
requiring collaboration.”154 The foundation of calculus-based (and swift) trust between 
individuals and groups is, thus, only assumed because no personal relationship exists. 
Furthermore, there is no time to build the confidence typically needed to develop and 
maintain trust.155 Swift trust is therefore assumed by way of professional reputation alone, 
with Meyerson, Weick, and Kramer suggesting that the situation demands the parties 
involved act as if trust is present without it actually developing.156  
Three elements influence swift trust, according to Hyllengren et al., including 
individual, relationship, and organizational factors. Individual factors suggest that a person 
with a high level of emotional stability is more apt to trust. That person decides whether 
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the task is acceptable and whether he wants to be a good team player. Relationship factors 
suggest that if a person has a good reputation, the contribution he provides will be more 
meaningful, primarily driven by an ability to be flexible and innovate. Organizational 
factors that contribute to swift trust deal with role clarity or role ambiguity, availability of 
resources to increase operational flexibility, and a system of decentralized decision 
making.157 Thus, these three factors work together to help fill the gap of a relationship and 
approach some level of collaborative effort.  
A deficiency of swift trust and, in turn, calculus-based trust is its inability to be 
persuaded. Swift trust is temporary in nature and breadth and often “tenuous and 
unstable. . . . It can be lost at the slightest appearance of incompetence or naiveté.”158 The 
clarity of role responsibility is also limited. Meyerson, Weick, and Kramer offer that parties 
involved in a complex task have to depend on common knowledge and known skills to 
collaborate, “yet individuals have little time to sort out who knows precisely what” in 
calculus-based trust.159 Without that clarity, role ambiguity can challenge the assumption 
of trust. For example, a lack of knowledge concerning a supporting unit’s training, 
capabilities, and operational tempo might cause such role ambiguity.160  
At least two of the three elements of swift trust, as spelled out by Hyllengren et al., 
were lacking between SWAT and PSBS at Columbine. There was no relationship to build 
on to determine whether first responder units, such as SWAT and PSBS, had a good 
reputation or not, so competency and confidence were lacking. Moreover, it was unclear 
to tactical units whether the bomb technicians present could be flexible and innovate. The 
absent relationship between SWAT and PSBS at Columbine also inhibited the 
organizational qualities needed for calculus-based trust. Role clarity suffered because there 
was no knowledge transfer, demonstrated by the delay in incorporating bomb technicians 
in the SWAT units that first entered the school, even though IEDs were present inside.  
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2. Knowledge-Based Trust 
At the Columbine High School shooting, the Incident Command System (ICS) 
coordinated the response, but the relationship and organizational elements needed for 
calculus-based (swift) trust did not exist between SWAT and PSBS. In contrast, 20 years 
later, at the Pulse nightclub massacre, ICS was again used, but knowledge-based trust 
instead of calculus-based trust was at play. As with Columbine, Pulse can be viewed as an 
exercise in and failure of knowledge-based trust.  
What happened at Columbine was not lost on SWAT and PSBS professionals 
nationwide, as some progress has been made. Indeed, a reliance on calculus-based trust 
gave way to knowledge-based trust. Instead of assuming the competency of an individual 
or group and trusting it solely on that assumption, knowledge-based trust relies on the 
specific information one has about another.161 Known competency builds on perceived 
capabilities. Predictive behavior then forms the foundation of knowledge-based trust.  
As it became more widely used, the ICS model in the United States helped 
knowledge-based trust develop among first responders. Dan Kaszeta, an expert in the 
Hazmat field, suggests ICS is a useful tool to promote unit integration and interagency 
cooperation for joint crisis response.162 ICS is a standardized model that allows personnel 
from different units and agencies to organize quickly to meet the demands of a critical 
incident. The model is widely applicable and can be used for planned events, natural 
disasters, and acts of terrorism. ICS encourages communication flow throughout the 
organization, and it is one way to integrate different units and disciplines, as common 
mission goals are then easier to measure and obtain.163 Thus, ICS has created a structure 
from which knowledge-based trust can develop. 
Discovering response weaknesses while developing solutions during ICS training 
can facilitate the development of trust between disciplines, much as Dirks and Ferrin as 
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well as Klinger and Rojek opine. Fundamentally, though, ICS in the United States is seen 
only as an organizational structure, with a weak focus on developing relationships. FEMA 
makes this point when it defines ICS as an organizational structure:  
a standardized on-scene emergency management construct specifically 
designed to provide for the adoption of an integrated organizational 
structure that reflects the complexity and demands of single or multiple 
incidents, without being hindered by jurisdictional boundaries.164  
ICS may be a good place to start developing trust, but reliance on ICS once again assumes 
trust exists between individuals and groups based on organizational structure alone. Simply 
ability to assign SWAT and PSBS to the same ICS structure, for instance, in a strike team 
or task force, and expect them to work together, is limited because certain tactical 
procedures must be pre-established and sanctioned by participating authorities. Such 
coordination supposes prior thought and planning have taken place to address clarity of 
roles and develop a common knowledge (predictive behavior) of response options. When 
planners and responders do not frequently work together and are forced to integrate, 
problems can arise out of role ambiguity and knowledge gaps.165  
Janssen et al. offer that under “urgent, dynamic conditions of disaster, [ICS, and 
knowledge-based trust] almost always fail”.166 Jensen and Waugh, in their study of the U.S. 
ICS experience, found it was critical for participants using ICS to have “pre-incident 
working relationships with one another based on trust and frequent contact . . . leading up 
to a response.”167 Thus, knowledge-based trust—on which ICS relies—has its limits in 
critical incident response because a strong foundation of trust still does not exist.  
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By all accounts, SWAT and PSBS coordinated more effectively in the Pulse 
nightclub response because they had knowledge (predictive behavior) of each other’s 
capabilities. Each discipline, even from multi-agencies, was familiar with each other by 
skill and reputation. Organizational elements and an awareness of capabilities existed, but 
the reliance on knowledge-based trust was still not enough as certain obstacles caused 
problems. For example, command and control suffered. As described in the after-action 
report from the Pulse nightclub incident, “Specialized law enforcement units should 
regularly train together to ensure familiarity with each unit’s policies, procedures, and 
tactics.”168 An additional observation notes that following the explosive breach, SWAT 
and PSBS elements became disorganized and uncoordinated. The report recommended that 
SWAT and PSBS focus joint training on familiarizing each team with “one another’s 
command and control, and tactical protocols” to reach an appropriate level of 
communication, planning, and execution.169  
Perceived capabilities and predictive behaviors, the basis of knowledge-based trust, 
fell short in the uncertainty of the Pulse attack. Infrequent training opportunities and limited 
personal encounters beforehand suggest that knowledge-based trust is not enough for a 
crisis response of the magnitude of Columbine or Pulse. A firm relationship and, thus, 
robust trust did not exist between SWAT and PSBS, even when both disciplines were from 
the same agency.  
3. Identification-Based Trust 
For SWAT and PSBS to operate effectively with each other in a crisis response—
for example, an active shooter or domestic terrorism incident—a relationship based on trust 
must be developed before a crisis demands it. Moynihan illustrates that relationships based 
on mutual trust helped facilitate coordination in the aftermath of both the Oklahoma City 
Bombing and the 9/11 attack on the Pentagon.170 In both cases, key players knew each 
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other personally, having established working relationships before the incident. 
Identification-based trust helps to develop that relationship, as parties begin to appreciate 
and understand each other’s intentions.171 Thus, mutual understanding and trust form the 
basis of identification-based trust. Groups begin to develop a salient common identification 
that increases the opportunities for cooperation, and a collective identity creates joint goals 
and shared values. Indeed, identification-based trust resembles Covey’s third wave of trust, 
with the underlying tenet being the creation of “structures, systems, and symbols,” which 
help align organizational principles.172 Information and role clarity are openly shared, 
mistakes are tolerated and seen as a way of learning, and the culture is one of innovation. 
In addition, members are candid with each other, and there is a high level of accountability, 
both personally and organizationally. In identification-based trust, Covey’s four qualities 
of trust start to connect—integrity, intent, capabilities, and results align, affecting a group’s 
shared identity and improving collaboration.173  
Again, identification-based trust’s component of shared values and identity is 
synonymous with having interpersonal relationships between parties. Moynihan, in his 
study on ICS and network governance, found that interpersonal trust was an indispensable 
complement to ICS, which has often been described as “relationship driven.”174 Moynihan 
suggests that in the chaos of a critical incident, when an organization is strained, 
relationships based on mutual trust become “the primary means by which things [get] 
done . . . [and are] frequently the primary force behind successful operation.”175  
Much like calculus- and knowledge-based trust, identification-based trust has 
limitations in emergency response. Rousseau et al. suggest the alignment of information, 
accountability, and common values “derives from repeated encounters over time.”176 Webb 
complements this argument, explaining that groups and individuals may be defined as 
 
171 Lewicki and Bunker, “Developing and Maintaining Trust,” 122–23. 
172 Covey, The Speed of Trust, 244–46. 
173 Covey, 252, 265. 
174 Moynihan, “Network Governance of Crisis Response,” 908. 
175 Moynihan, 908. 
176 Rousseau et al., “Not So Different After All,” 399. 
43 
trustworthy simply because “we have had good personal experience with them in the 
past.”177 Lewicki, Tomlinson, and Gillespie add that from repeated encounters, “trust 
develops from within the relationship itself, rather than from external validations.”178 
Huemer states that a combination of common identification, trust (respect), and a time 
focus (patience) enable the cooperative advantage of identification-based trust.179 Thus, 
identification-based trust requires repeated encounters, like those suggested in the Pulse 
massacre’s after-action review, for it to become viable to critical incident response.  
Another caution about identification-based trust is that any perceived violation can 
negatively transform to enmity. Because a group’s identity is involved at this level of trust, 
any violation has the strength to disrupt common interests and values. Lewicki and Bunker 
suggest a violation at this level can be asymmetrical, as “it only requires one person to 
experience it as a moral violation.”180 Although identification-based trust can be more 
robust than calculus- and knowledge-based trust in crisis response, it too can be fragile on 
a personal level. 
4. The Fluidity of Trust and Working Relationships 
Because identification-based trust demands alignment of culture and values to 
promote collaboration, numerous and sometimes conflicting motives can shape the 
development of a trusting environment. Said another way, reasons for both trust and 
distrust may coexist.181 Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman provide a framework for 
understanding the fluid relationship between trust and distrust. In their work, trust is 
defined as the “willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based 
on the expectation that the other party will perform a particular action.”182 Distrust is then 
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defined as expecting others not to act in the best interests of another party, believing that 
“capable and responsible behavior will not be forthcoming.”183  
Instead of adhering to the traditional view of trust—that trust is either present or 
absent, in opposition—Lewicki, McAllister, and Bies suggest trust and distrust are 
linked.184 Trust, much like any relationship, is multifaceted, and elements of trust grow and 
change through a person’s life experiences with others. Thus, any balance of trust, by 
nature, is likely temporary. Trust, opines Lewicki, McAllister, and Bies, “matures with 
interaction frequency, duration, and the diversity of challenges that relationship partners 
encounter and face together.”185 A change in any of those values affects trust’s strength, 
but as the values combine, trust is enhanced. In turn, the consistency of trust overall can 
vary. In this sense, both trust and distrust serve to reduce a situation’s complexity. An 
individual or group is either asked to help because trust already exists or not asked because 
trust does not exist; both involve expectations of behavior. Figure 5 depicts the spectrum 
of trust and distrust. 
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Figure 5. Integrating Trust and Distrust: Alternative Social 
Realities186 
The distinction is evident, considering the differences between low trust and high 
distrust. Similarly, the contrast between high trust and low distrust is telling. Lewicki, 
McAllister, and Bies also identify several waypoints along the continuum of trust, from 
casual acquaintances and mere professional courtesy to highly segmented relationships.187 
Based on the conditions and situation, trust can move quickly across the trust and distrust 
spectrum. The fluidity of trust can either reduce the complexity and uncertainty of a critical 
event or exacerbate it.  
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Klimoski and Karol explain that trust can be a “hallmark of a healthy 
organization.”188 When spontaneity is needed, such as in critical incident response, higher 
levels of trust foster creative problem-solving and effectiveness. On the other hand, low 
levels of trust depress creative problem-solving, collaboration, and group performance. 
Subsequently, one thing is clear. If cooperation is needed, as Gambetta suggests, it requires 
higher levels not lower levels of trust. In this case, identification-based trust offers clear 
advantages over calculus- or knowledge-based trust alone.  
Calculus-based trust relies on assumptions, and knowledge-based trust relies on 
predictions. Covey adds, “Different than the traditional approaches of coordination and 
cooperation, real collaboration creates the key opportunity model of today’s world” 
(original emphasis).189 Coordination can suffice for low-trust relationships, as with 
calculus- and knowledge-based trust. The closer one approaches collaboration, the greater 
the need for identification-based trust to achieve the benefits of a stronger partnership and 
better execution.190 Figure 5 underscores that point. The quadrants of high trust and low 
distrust give rise to greater interdependence, confidence, and innovation among people 
working together—a true working relationship. Conversely, low trust means having no 
confidence, and high leads to segmented and bounded relationships—the opposite qualities 
needed for identification-based trust and critical incident response to work. 
B. BARRIERS TO TRUST  
Trust might be elusive, as some say, but its impediments are decidedly less so. 
Competition, role ambiguity, personalities, group identity, and culture can all play a 
negative role in the development of trust and collaborative response to critical incidents.  
1. Competition 
Although SWAT an PSBS are not natural competitors, competition is manifest in a 
multitude of forms during a critical incident response, enough so to inhibit trust. At the 
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leadership level, competition can become a factor when one team or discipline prioritizes 
its needs or goals at the expense of others. Power calls this type of competition “inter-team 
competition.”191 Competition can also occur at the “intra-team level when team members 
[pursue] personal goals at the expense of collective goals.”192  
Although some forms of competition can be helpful, other forms impede the 
development of trust. For example, if it emboldens team members to perform better, 
competition can be useful. On the other hand, competition can reflect one person’s or 
team’s desire to outperform the other. Thus, Power shows competition can be the 
“antithesis to cooperation” if it is not honed.193 For example, competition can entice 
dominant egos to surface. Power and Alison have found that competition increases when 
differing agencies or disciplines bring their own expertise to the fight.194 They note how 
role ambiguity primes individuals or groups for harmful competition, related to the 
uncertainty of goals. Such uncertainty may lead to conflict and distrust, especially when 
working under extreme pressure.195 Thus, a better understanding of roles can limit 
unhealthy competition and enable trust.  
Healthy competition must be developed, however.196 Critical emergencies are time-
sensitive, and incident commanders depend on cooperation. Therefore, leaders understand 
that time pressures in a crisis cannot allow conflict and disagreements. At the leadership 
level, competition can become a factor when one team or discipline prioritizes its needs or 
goals at the expense of others—the segmented, bounded response Lewicki, McAllister, and 
Bies spoke of in their discussion of trust and distrust.197 Competition works best when it 
empowers a team to compete in pursuit of interdependent goals that are based on role 
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clarity and effective knowledge transfer. Similarly, Gambetta opines that the role of 
competition in trust “may depend upon cooperation to a much larger extent than is 
generally acknowledged.”198 Mutually beneficial competition, especially in Western 
society, is one of the most basic forms of human cooperation.  
2. Personality 
Another challenge to developing trust is managing the personality differences that 
trigger conflict, stress, and distrust. Research suggests that SWAT operators and bomb 
technicians have similar yet distinct personalities. SWAT operators, according to Young, 
Hennington, and Eggleston, have significant personality differences from other police 
officers.199 They have a high level of conscientiousness; they are organized, deliberate, 
reliable, and self-determined. However, they rate low in being imaginative, creative, and 
open to change.200 SWAT operators have a strong desire for teamwork and tend to be 
extroverted, exhibiting a field-dependent nature that relies on structure and direction.201 
SWAT’s nature, as explained by Young, Hennington, and Eggleston, should enable an 
opportunity for developing trust and collaboration with others.202  
On the other hand, bomb technicians, according to Cooper, have two distinct 
characteristics: flexibility and a tendency toward the unconventional.203 Glicksohn and 
Bozna agree with Cooper’s assessment, stating that bomb technicians also sustain “a 
detached mode of operation and social isolation.”204 They have little need for physical self-
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confidence or teamwork skills. They tend to be more introverted and exhibit a field-
independent nature, relying more on autonomy than do SWAT members.205 Research by 
Bundy and Sims correlates with Glicksohn and Bozna’s research, suggesting bomb 
technicians may be more comfortable with being responsible for incidents “where analysis 
rather than abstract thinking is required.”206 Unlike SWAT, the introverted nature of bomb 
technicians, as explained by Glicksohn and Bozna, can hinder the development of trust and 
collaboration.207  
According to McShane, studies have shown a “strong association between 
personality and a variety of workplace behaviors and outcomes.”208 Every person engaged 
in the cooperative effort brings a different personality style that needs consideration.209 The 
same challenges exacerbated by personality differences may instead be used for everyone’s 
benefit if they are acknowledged and, if need be, confronted.210 Understanding the different 
personalities involved makes it easier to appreciate and hone people’s collective 
understanding of the task at hand.  
Finally, Schlenker, Helm, and Tedeschi found that in a conflict involving 
communication, personality had an additive effect on the value of reliance and 
credibility.211 Such attributes as personality can influence one’s ability to perceive 
another’s ability to be cooperative, trusting, or suspicious.212 The comparison of 
personality profiles shows that SWAT personnel tend to be more extroverted yet less open 
to change and in need of more structure. Bomb technicians, on the other hand, tend to be 
introverted yet more flexible and less interested in teamwork. The distinctions between the 
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two personalities can cause strife and a reluctance to trust one another, but the disciplines 
do share one characteristic. Each personality profile helps SWAT operators and bomb 
technicians survive and perform well under stress in their separate environments.213  
3. Social Identity and Group Culture 
Such specialized teams as SWAT and PSBS strongly identify with members of their 
own group—similar to a family, sports team, or any other working relationship. McShane 
explains that even though one’s heredity influences personality, an individual’s 
socialization and interaction with others also shape it.214 Henri Tajfel explains that a 
person’s identity can be strongly influenced by categorization, that is, being a member of 
a distinct group. He argues, “Our salient self-images may be based solely or primarily on 
our group memberships.”215 Social identity, according to Brannan, is how a person 
perceives and interacts in the world and how one sees oneself in relation to others. A 
person’s identity encourages the development of a narrative that begins to assume values 
and emotions about oneself and others.216 Social interaction follows, and “when individuals 
come together and engage with each other . . . the group becomes [another] source of their 
socially constructed identity.”217 Thus, the group identification and narratives that emerge 
need to be maintained.  
Berger notes of group dynamics that group identity requires an in-group narrative 
to explain the beliefs, traits, and practices of the group. Thus, the group’s story becomes 
“what the identity means, where it comes from, and where it is going.”218 The emergence 
of these qualities in a group setting makes the group more distinct from others.219 An out-
group has its own beliefs, traits, and practices, and it produces its own narrative as well. 
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These narratives do not always align. As Berger explains, the information an in-group has 
concerning an out-group “usually includes a mix of truth, interpretation, and fiction.”220 
Even if trivial, categorization of people into in-groups and out-groups results in favoritism 
among groups and impedes trust.221  
Culture plays a decisive role in how collaboration works between different 
individuals or groups. Webber explains that cultural differences counter the development 
of trust, and low levels of trust are associated with heterogeneous groups.222 Even though 
merging the abilities and skills of specialized groups might increase performance, Webber 
says it is the cultural differences “stemming from the functional diversity . . . that result in 
lower trust within a team.”223 Sitkin and Roth agree, offering that distrust develops “when 
an individual or group is perceived as not sharing key cultural values.”224 Specialized teams 
that have a high level of cohesion and influential culture make it challenging to develop 
trust in collaborative efforts. Furthermore, Power adds that cultural identification can affect 
one’s willingness to cooperate with others as “ingroup identification has been found to 
predict collective efficacy and trust in teams.”225 Thus, the development of a cultural 
identity and group narrative can exacerbate an unwillingness to trust.  
Culture is the “glue that binds an organization together,” states Stinchcomb and 
Ordaz, further suggesting that more consideration needs to be afforded cultures than just 
structural alignment in a work setting.226 An underlying culture helps develop a sense of 
shared identity.227 It provides guidelines for behavior, helps provide stability, and 
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establishes operational clarity. A shared sense of culture provides “an anchor . . . that binds 
individuals together in collective unity.”228 Conversely, when a union with another culture 
threatens a strong culture, that anchor can lose its grip, resulting in stress and uncertainty. 
In the SWAT and PSBS discussion, this dynamic translates into social identity and group 
narratives that often hinder cooperation between both disciplines, decreasing levels of trust, 
as suggested by Webber.  
4. Time Constraints 
The analysis of SWAT and PSBS shows the limited time available for both 
disciplines to work together. If the two disciplines spend limited time working together, 
then trust issues related to role ambiguity and confidence can surface from a siloed mindset. 
Different cultural issues, personalities, and unhealthy competition can then flourish, 
limiting the ability to promote cooperation. As Lars Huemer suggests, “trust and time” are 
key in promoting “cooperative advantage” because time “depends on cultural boundaries 
that influence perspectives on the past, present, and future.”229 In Huemer’s model, a strong 
union of identification, trust, and time grows in any emerging cooperative relationship, 
with an eye toward expectations.230 Huemer uses the term “patience” to describe time’s 
value, arguing that learning about another, not only about their skills and abilities, is time-
consuming.231 Huemer’s theory correlates with identification-based trust’s focus on 
aligning collective identity while creating joint goals and shared values.  
Partha Dasgupta agrees with Huemer, suggesting that “for trust to be developed 
between individuals they must have repeated encounters, and they must have some memory 
of previous experiences.”232 Dasgupta adds that trust is invariably linked to reputation, and 
that link takes time to acquire. Both Lewicki, Tomlinson, and Gillespie and Rousseau et 
al. offer more on time’s value in trust, explaining that the more encounters occur, the 
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greater the likelihood trust will develop from within the relationship instead of from 
external factors such as familiarity.233  
In short, positive past experiences allow one to become comfortable with another 
in times of need. The opposite, unfortunately, is also true. Time is a finite resource, much 
like a commodity, according to Dasgupta, and is the gateway to better collaboration.234 If 
SWAT and PSBS must improve collaboration, more time spent together beforehand can 
help develop the trust needed during a critical incident.  
C. PROMOTERS OF TRUST 
Covey asserts, “Trust means confidence. The opposite of trust—distrust—is 
suspicion.”235 Covey explains that a few factors drive suspicion, including capabilities and 
track record.236 Covey’s claim complements Dirks and Ferrin point that trust is tangible 
and can be quantified and measured.237 Therefore, trust, according to Wilson et al., can 
easily break down “when team members lack a shared understanding of the task and 
surrounding environment.”238 Furthermore, Wilson et al. suggest that Dirks and Ferrin’s 
concept of shared understanding means shared cognitions—the collective cognitive 
activity from individual group members—affect the overall group’s goals and activities.  
Wilson et al. studied commonly shared cognitive breakdowns through the lens of 
teamwork. These authors parse shared cognition into three categories: communication, 
coordination, and cooperation.239 These categories contain the visible, tangible, and 
measurable markers of trust suggested by Gambetta, Covey, and Dirks and Ferrin.240  
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1. Communication 
SWAT and PSBS commonly undertake high-risk scenarios that require a high level 
of communication between unit members. One cannot overstate the role of communication 
in joint hazard response to emergencies because it represents one of the biggest challenges 
to a collaborative response.241 Such factors as information exchange, phraseology, and 
closed-loop communication each play a part in the attribute of communication, according 
to Wilson et al. If not used appropriately, information exchange, phraseology, and closed-
loop communication factors can lead to an overall communication failure that decreases 
the shared cognition a team needs to collaborate effectively.242 Information exchange 
pertains to what information is shared and is active when free-flowing and unencumbered. 
Phraseology refers to how the information is interpreted, and closed-loop communication 
affects the interpretation of the messages shared. In other words, these factors determine 
whether both the sender and receiver clearly understand the message.243 
Effective communication can shape trust and distrust because any establishment of 
trust implies the ability to communicate freely and openly. Communication works best 
when a wide conduit, or bandwidth, exists between parties. Trust—either broad or 
narrow—is this conduit of communication.244 The relationship between communication 
and trust is a direct one: when trust is high, the bandwidth of communication is broad, but 
when trust is low or more limited, bandwidth can be exceedingly narrow. For example, 
when trust is superficial or non-existent, participants are less likely to provide input and 
offer viable alternatives, thus limiting the collaborative effort.  
Trust allows one the ability to influence a situation. Effective communication 
reduces the barriers to trust and improves the shared cognition of those involved. Smart 
and Barnum explain, “Failure to communicate causes conflict, disrupts relationships, and 
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diminishes output”—the opposite promoting trust.245 It comes as no surprise, then, that if 
prior communications are truthful, future communications will likely be perceived as 
truthful, according to Schlenker, Helm, and Tedeschi.246 Thus, a series of positive 
encounters and a relationship beforehand can be impactful during a crisis. The alternative 
is also true.  
2. Coordination 
The shared cognition of coordination highlighted by Wilson et al. includes role 
clarity and knowledge transfer.247 If SWAT and PSBS must develop trust to work more 
effectively, each discipline must understand the other’s roles and tasks. Trust can be 
cultivated through better role clarity.248 As Curnin explains, role clarity can affect trust 
because first responders often react to each other vis-à-vis their roles rather than 
personalities, initially.249 Team members must understand how to perform a specific task 
and who is responsible for that task.250 
Wilson et al. suggest that trust develops more quickly with clarification of a 
specialist’s knowledge and his or her role in a collaborative team. Consequently, role 
clarity is vital in terms of integrating groups that have never worked together.251 The focus, 
suggests Power, is to improve team work competencies by developing “a shared and 
accurate understanding of roles and responsibilities across the team network.”252 Role 
clarity improves the leverage of cooperative advantage and coordination during an 
emergency response.253 A firmer understanding of roles will also reduce uncertainty and 
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bolster confidence in the abilities of others.254 To ensure that a job can be done, the groups 
involved must have people who understand what the other group has to offer and how it 
can affect the situation. Conversely, role ambiguity is caused by a lack of knowledge 
concerning a supporting unit’s training, capabilities, and operational tempo.255 Role 
ambiguity frustrates the development of trust.  
Knowledge transfer—another essential facet in the shared cognition of 
coordination—plays a significant role in a unit’s success.256 Levin and Cross opine that 
groups, teams, and organizations that encourage the sharing of knowledge and collective 
experience are likely “more innovative, efficient, and effective.”257 In contrast, gaps in 
“shared knowledge may lead to miscommunication and uncooperative behavior because of 
a failure to recognize and integrate contingencies of a task.”258  
When individuals or groups trust that the other parties are competent, they accept 
the information received because they perceive its value and know it will be used 
appropriately.259 Townley and Garfield explain, “Knowledge is a collective good.”260 The 
authors elaborate that knowledge “production, transmission, storage, and retrieval require 
that we can trust our sources, our collaborators, and the social institutions that mediate 
these activities.”261 Thus, trust must be implicit in the creation and distribution of 
knowledge.262  
Levine and Cross conducted a study focusing on knowledge and its relative 
strength, or “tie-strength.”263 Tie-strength is a concept that characterizes the interactive 
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relationship between different groups or parties, ranging from weak to strong ties based on 
closeness or regularity of interactions.264 The study supported trust as a moderating link 
between tie-strength and knowledge.265 Even when only weak ties existed between groups, 
trust alone was a substantive element manifesting competence. Furthermore, a reliance on 
others’ competency is vital for tacit knowledge exchange.266  
Effective knowledge transfer and trust encourage each other because they help align 
a group’s skills and abilities. They also promote role clarity when an individual finds 
himself outside his traditional role assignment.267 Groups like SWAT and PSBS can then 
wholly integrate because, posit Wilson et al., they are better able to “anticipate and predict 
the needs and actions of team members.”268 Thus, effective knowledge transfer can work 
well with knowledge- and identification-based trust because it communicates the strengths 
and weaknesses of the other group.  
3. Cooperation  
Shared cognition factors, such as a person’s attitudes and motivations, can influence 
a person’s ability to trust. Cooperation can be measured by observable behaviors, for 
example, an individual or group having an orientation toward teamwork, collective 
efficacy, and team cohesion.269 Team orientation is more than a person’s choice of putting 
the needs of a team before himself. Instead, team orientation is perceived as how to perform 
a given task and the task’s expected outcome. Task inputs from others become vital as an 
interdependent relationship builds. Individuals with a high level of team orientation can 
better coordinate and communicate with increased synergy. Wilson et al. suggest that 
because first responders, like SWAT and PSBS, are likely to “have different yet vital 
information . . . [they] may offer a unique perspective on how to approach a situation that 
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must be shared and integrated to meet team objectives.”270 The alignment of resources, 
through role clarity and knowledge transfer, can build the shared cognition needed to foster 
trust and develop better collaboration.  
Collective efficacy is the belief that a group—SWAT or PSBS—has in its collective 
the ability to handle a task.271 SWAT and PSBS base their collective efficacy in the trust 
they have in their fellow team members, thus increasing their shared cognition. The belief 
of interdependence on one another is recognized to complete complex tasks. Teams with 
high efficacy promote a one-team approach, thereby discouraging individual actions that 
could adversely affect the team. Team cohesion, the propensity of a group to stick together 
and remain unified, is also a component of the shared cognition of cooperation.272 A team 
demonstrates higher levels of cohesion when its members trust one another implicitly, thus 
resulting in higher levels of performance through improved communication, role clarity, 
and knowledge transfer.  
The analysis of trust’s impediments and promoters shows that trust has specific 
tangible components—shared cognition of communication, coordination, and 
cooperation—as demonstrated by Wilson et al. Role clarity, knowledge transfer, team 
orientation, collective efficacy, and team cohesion are the measurable, tangible qualities of 
trust. If trust is not honed, role ambiguity, competition, personality differences, and group 
identity create hesitation and distrust in crisis response. These factors are challenging yet 
vital to overcome in any relationship, but especially one as critical as a collaborative 
response to a crisis.  
D. THE ROLE OF TRUST IN CRISIS RESPONSE  
Luhmann submits a difference between familiarity and trust that plays a role in 
crisis response. He suggests that the value of trust “cannot be transferred to complex 
societies based on the division of labor” alone.273 However, other factors can emerge 
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through individual social institutions, including social networks and work relationships that 
build on trust.  
On the one hand, in a non-crisis situation, familiarity alone can be beneficial, as 
seen in calculus- and knowledge-based trust. It allows one the benefit of quick re-entry 
from the unfamiliar back into the familiar. Any lack of competency or confidence, as 
suggested by Luhmann, might simply mean a sense of dissatisfaction.274 In a non-crisis 
event, the relationship between competence and trust is not a zero-sum game. In other 
words, more confidence does not mean that less trust is needed, or vice versa.  
In a crisis, on the other hand, a subtle distinction separates familiarity and trust. 
Familiarity may be unavoidable with first responders but is insufficient to undertake risk 
in a situation.275 In demanding ventures such as an active shooter or terrorist attack, the 
“possible damage may be greater than the advantage you seek” if one relies on familiarity 
alone.276 Internal and external conditions may mean that mere familiarity is not enough for 
trust to emerge, much like Lewicki and Bunker suggested in their explanation of calculus-
and knowledge-based trust.277 Indeed, the results of simple assumptions and familiarity 
were on display at both the Columbine High School and Pulse nightclub events.  
Trust permeates critical incident response and the ability, or lack thereof, to 
collaborate. Webb states, “Crisis is a uniquely flamed crucible for the creation and 
destruction of trust.”278 The centrality of trust, according to Webb, is perhaps even more 
importantly linked to crisis response than to other circumstances.279 Webb suggests that 
very few conditions provide an opportunity to affect trust more directly. Thus, a crisis 
becomes an amplifier and magnifier of trust. The greater the stakes, the more dramatic the 
outcomes of success—the salience of trust increases in a crisis when one has to depend on 
others for help. Therefore, trust plays a vital role in deciding what and who fills in the 
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needed resources to mitigate the crisis.280 Trust in critical incident response becomes a 
dependent relationship.  
1. Taxonomy of Uncertainty  
In a crisis response, the collaboration between unfamiliar disciplines (such as 
SWAT and PSBS), each with its areas of expertise, roles, and objectives, happens under 
high-risk, high-stress conditions.281 Unfortunately, collaboration adds a layer of 
complexity to an already ambiguous, dangerous situation. Mounting confusion about roles, 
responsibilities, intentions, and overall capabilities can hamper a collective response built 
on shared purpose and clarity of a unified mission.282 Power and Alison explain that any 
major critical incident stresses the “physical, psychological and interpersonal skills” of first 
responders.283 A level of uncertainty, inherent to any crisis, then exacerbates the problem. 
Figure 6 depicts the taxonomy of uncertainty during emergency incident response as 
described by Power and Alison. 
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Figure 6. Taxonomy of Endogenous and Exogenous Uncertainty 
during Emergency Incident Command284 
As Figure 6 shows, the individual components of the taxonomy all contribute to 
uncertainty during a critical incident response.285 The endogenous branch of uncertainty 
relates to the characteristics of crisis response that are uncontrollable, such as information, 
resources, and time management. The exogenous branch of uncertainty governs controlled 
team processes, including role understanding (role clarity), communication (knowledge 
transfer), competition, and trust. Each of these factors is a team process that either promotes 
or inhibits success in uncertain situations. That trust appears next to communication, role 
understanding, and competition should be no surprise as those characteristics inhibit or 
promote trust. In sum, Power and Alison show that distrust or trust uncertainty can result 
 
284 Source: Power and Alison, “Redundant Deliberation about Negative Consequences,” 250. 
285 Power and Alison, “Redundant Deliberation about Negative Consequences,” 248. 
62 
in “decision inertia,” a reluctance to incorporate new information, manifesting in the 
tendency to repeat previous choices regardless of the consequences.286 
2. Trust in Inter-organizational Collaboration 
Hocevar, Jansen, and Thomas evaluated inter-organizational collaboration relating 
to local, state, and federal agencies involved in crisis response.287 Their aim was to 
understand the “driving” and “restraining” forces of collaborative efforts, with the intention 
of developing a conceptual model to improve the capacity to collaborate during a crisis.288  
Several barriers to collaboration, as detailed in Hocevar, Jansen, and Thomas’s 
study, relate to the development of trust (see Table 6).  
Table 6. Most Frequently Cited Factors in Collaboration289 
 
 
As shown in Table 6, the most cited barrier to better collaboration is the lack of trust. The 
barriers of inhibiting attitudes, lack of familiarity, lack of information sharing, and 
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Success Factors Barriers
"Felt Need" to Collaborate (10) Lack of trust (13)
Common goal (9) Inhibiting attitudes (12)
Motivation (7) Lack of familiarity (10)
Communication (7) Poor leadership (7)
Absence of competitive rivalries (7) Competition (7)
Social capital (5) Motivation (5)
Trust (4) Lack of information sharing (5)
Familiarity (3) Impeding rules or policies (4)
Interoperability (3) Inhibiting behaviors (3) 
Leadership motivation (3) Resource scarcity (3)
Coordination of resources (3) Lack of flexibility (3)
Appreciation of other's perspective (3) Lack of competency (3)
Authority to act/ decide (3) Lack of accountability (3) 
Most Frequently Cited Factors
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inhibiting behaviors strongly support the tangible and appreciable means cited by Dirks 
and Ferrin and Wilson et al.290 Together, the inhibitors related to trust account for 55 
percent of the total barriers listed in the authors’ study. Other documented barriers to 
collaborative efforts, as noted by Hocevar, Jansen, and Thomas, include “disparate 
organizational cultures, . . . mistrust and skepticism, and lack of knowledge of others’ 
capabilities.”291 These factors also directly correlate with trust’s implicit role in crisis 
response. Nevertheless, trust is noted only four times as a factor of successful collaboration, 
a meager number indeed.292 Hocevar, Jansen, and Thomas, however, make it clear that 
inter-organizational collaboration overwhelmingly lacks trust, citing it as the number-one 
barrier to effective collaboration between inter-organizational teams such as SWAT and 
PSBS. 
E. CONCLUSION  
If trust is the gold standard of better collaboration, how do SWAT and PSBS 
achieve better collaboration given the diffuse nature of American first responder agencies? 
One PSBS does not correspond with one SWAT team. Developing relationships to 
overcome the impediments to trust and promote trust is an excellent place to start.  
For SWAT and PSBS, overcoming Street’s norms of non-involvement and 
discovering each other’s weaknesses and strengths, as advocated by Dirks and Ferrin, can 
go a long way toward better developing the trust required for effective collaboration in 
crisis response.293 Moynihan, in his analysis of network characteristics in ICS, suggests 
“strong trust and positive relationships [facilitate] problem-solving, role allocation, 
facilitating coordination, and incorporating emergent actors. . . . Weaker relationships 
[have] led to solo actions.”294 Moynihan further states that those relationships are difficult, 
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if not impossible, to build during a crisis.295 Trust is a scarce resource, according to 
Gambetta, and it does not translate well during the heat of battle when trust has not already 
been developed.296 As seen in the analysis of identification-based trust, developing 
relationships and networking before an incident is the right time to foster trust, much as 
Huemer suggests. Identification-based trust also has the ability to be more robust, as 
Lewicki and Bunker reveal in their research and Moynihan demonstrates in his analysis of 
critical incident response at the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 and the Pentagon on 9/11.  
Research shows not only that trust matters in a crisis, but it matters in a number of 
specific ways.297 Trust enables cooperation, innovation, and problem solving; improves 
role clarity and knowledge transfer; reduces conflict; and results in faster decision making 
and meaningful actions. Trust can be earned through repeated encounters that are 
meaningful to the individuals, groups, and disciplines involved. Trust, through positive 
pre-crisis working relationships, then becomes less fragile and more durable during a crisis. 
Moreover, as Gambetta imparts, trust might be the catalyst that “uncovers dormant 
preferences for [collaboration].”298 
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IV. COLLABORATION 
According to Andersson, in order to achieve certain objectives, organizations 
increasingly negotiate and depend on others to overcome the complexity of today’s 
demands.299 SWAT and PSBS are no different, especially when responding to a joint or 
complex hazard, such as an active shooter incident. When trust serves as the foundation of 
an integrative effort, members clearly understand each other’s roles and believe in others’ 
competencies. The focus turns to collaboration, as opposed to the narrow perspective of 
Curnin et al. on tasks, as illustrated at Columbine High School on that fateful day.300 James 
and Wooten submit that in a collaborative response, members are more willing to support 
each other when their relationship is “grounded in expertise, information, and experience” 
relevant to the team’s mission.301  
With an understanding of trust’s tangible components from the last chapter, this 
chapter examines building trust between SWAT and PSBS through tangible means, by 
encouraging role clarity, knowledge transfer, and effective communication. Building 
relationships and increasing collaboration are ways to achieve and enhance trust between 
SWAT and PSBS when it matters most. Such challenges as complacency, practical 
application, and diversity exist. Moreover, because having SWAT and PSBS together in 
one agency is more the exception than the rule, this chapter focuses on collaboration 
through socialization, cross-functional teams, and boundary-spanning. As suggested by 
research, each of these approaches has been proven effective in collaborative efforts among 
different groups. This chapter addresses solutions and concludes by offering specific joint-
level training between SWAT and PSBS to facilitate the development of trust before a 
crisis demands it. Building a relationship will enhance the collaborative effort through 
confidence building, problem solving, and better role clarity, thus increasing the overall 
capabilities of both SWAT and PSBS.  
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A. BARRIERS 
Building a collaborative effort, much like building trust, has certain barriers to 
overcome. The barriers discussed here include the inertia of the status quo; the struggle to 
turn theory into practice; and diversity through variety, separation, and disparity of groups. 
Each of the barriers bears on the discussion of building a collaborative effort between 
SWAT and PSBS. 
1. Fighting the Status Quo 
As James Rieley suggests in his study about overcoming the barriers to effective 
collaboration, “good intentions are not enough.”302 Indeed, the police chief from Arvada, 
Colorado, suggests the lesson learned after Columbine about collaboration’s importance 
was fleeting. Even though there were opportunities to interact and maintain relationships, 
little by little, collaboration efforts were again abandoned. Donahue and Tuohy have found 
that “the term lessons learned is often a misnomer” (emphasis added).303 Lessons tend to 
be perishable, so they are not truly learned, and many gaps are never addressed.  
Emergency service organizations have also been accused of being resistant to 
change, particularly amid the complexity of crisis response.304 Indeed, Donahue and Tuohy 
point out that the need for training is one such common lesson repeatedly identified as 
problematic.305 Regarding change in the face of uncertainty, Edmondson and Roloff have 
found that “when uncertainty clouds our tentative thoughts and views . . . we take the path 
of reduced interpersonal resistance,” so communication and the maintenance of 
relationships suffer.306 Indeed, Webber suggests that the climate that enables collaboration 
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does not emerge naturally but must be cultivated and maintained.307 Finally, the more 
diverse groups are, the harder it will be for them to coalesce, so certain conditions must 
exist for collaboration to be successful.  
Complacency is the chief enemy of this meeting of the minds—or any other 
necessary change. William suggests that complacency is not an attitude but a result of bad 
habits: “Change your habits, and you change your response to every unknown or known 
threat.”308 Young Pecko agrees, opining that complacency is manifest when challenges and 
barriers to collaboration act as the inertial forces of the status quo.309  
2. Turning Theory into Practice 
Collaboration may be a popular buzzword in many professions, but attending to the 
last mile of a task is difficult because one has to turn theory into practice. Moreland and 
Levine understand this difficulty, noting that a bridge between academics and practitioners 
can be rare.310 Academics tend to rely on theories based on research done in a controlled 
setting while practitioners put their faith in experience and intuition from operating in 
complex, uncontrolled settings far removed from research labs. When research and real-
world events suggest change, practitioners often struggle with implementation. As Rieley 
shows, organizational leaders often know “what to do” but not “how to do it.”311 
In the context of SWAT and PSBS, role ambiguity and inadequate knowledge 
transfer directly affect the collaborative barrier of turning theory into practice. 
Stakeholders, whether agency executives or SWAT and PSBS commanders, might not 
have access (or timely access) to specific resources. In other cases, a working relationship 
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might not exist, or the relationship might be weak or dysfunctional. In the latter case, 
Street’s norms of non-involvement can flourish.312 Over time, bad habits can develop and 
cause the complacency that Young Pecko addresses.  
Collaboration, like trust, does not exist in a vacuum; it has to be cultivated and 
maintained. It builds from a repeated method: setting goals, showing enthusiasm, managing 
conflict, and obtaining the goal. As individuals and groups see their work contribute to the 
team’s overall success, it becomes possible for practitioners to appreciate the value of 
collaboration more fully.313 When collaboration increases, so does the potential for 
innovation, thus improving the collective capability. In the context of SWAT and PSBS 
collaboration, diversity is one such challenge.  
3. Overcoming Diversity  
The real opportunity for PSBS to interact with SWAT teams across a region or state 
is hampered by diversity, as Edmondson and Roloff explain, because collaboration is 
difficult “across disciplinary, status, geographical, or other boundaries.”314 The authors 
suggest diversity by itself can affect collaborative efforts through separation, variety, and 
disparity.315 Separation is manifested in two ways. The first is through group identities and 
bias. Team members, given a choice, prefer homogenous as opposed to heterogeneous 
groups.316 Homogenous teams have been found to produce a more trusting environment 
with better overall communication because they value similarity in attitudes and beliefs. 
However, cooperative ventures require broader communication than typical of such 
groups’ patterns. The overall desire to conform limits innovation and independent thinking, 
creating a groupthink culture, a tacit acceptance with no individual responsibility for 
critical thinking. Separation is also manifested in distance between groups. Different 
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groups, such as SWAT and PSBS, often work in different locations, so they develop 
practices and norms independently.  
Variety, too, presents itself in distinct ways, from differences in standard operating 
procedures to disparate group norms, which are common in any diverse group interaction. 
For example, learning styles are one such relevant example with SWAT and PSBS. As 
noted in Chapter III, bomb technicians tend to have different learning styles and 
intelligence strengths from tactical operators. Variety also presents differences in skills and 
expertise, as seen in the dissimilarities between SWAT and PSBS illustrated in Chapter II. 
Although combining different disciplines and specializations benefits critical incident 
response, Edmondson and Roloff note that “specialized team members can become 
spokespersons for their discipline, resulting in reduced flexibility and increased 
conflict.”317 Thus, personal agendas and egos can sideline teamwork. On the other hand, a 
healthy amount of conflict among specialized teams can also enhance team innovation and 
learning through the open sharing of information.318  
Disparity shows up in power differentials within a team or in the differences in 
professional status. Disparity might present itself as a formal instrument of rank or power 
or informally through ego. Thus, as suggested by Edmondson and Roloff, disparity “may 
be the most challenging source of diversity for ensuring collaboration.”319 Useful discourse 
is met with indirectness and abstraction when the ability to speak up and feel valued is 
threatened by disparity, constricting the direct flow of dialogue. Again, innovation suffers 
when one is reluctant to give input in a situation or task. Furthermore, negative stereotypes 
and misconceptions about a group’s ability can significantly hinder team performance. In 
contrast, teams that actively work to utilize the unique skills and assets of group members 
show a willingness to accept differences and enjoy a more open style of communication.  
Table 7, from Edmondson and Roloff, details examples of diversity, which relate 
well to the SWAT and PSBS collaboration discussion—as both professions are typically 
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separated by more than expertise. Each profession may come from different agencies, or 
SWAT and PSBS may be from the same agency but work under different organizational 
structures. Again, the opportunity to interact may be limited.  
Table 7. Examples of Team Diversity320 
Examples of Team Diversity 
Type of 
Disparity 
Demographic Expertise Location Status 




and identities exist 
Different education 
and training cause 












Expertise is valued 
over team identity 
Aligning team 
goals with local 
needs 
Deference to 






















As illustrated in Table 7, the different categories of diversity are not mutually 
exclusive. Collaborative efforts are likely to contain combinations of these categories, 
which increases the challenges to overcome. SWAT and PSBS, as examined in this thesis, 
have different group identities and tacit knowledge. Each discipline might not work in the 
same agency or the same geographical area, and each group can develop different social 
norms and report to different agency leadership. These differences apply directly to SWAT 
and PSBS’s missions in the United States, affecting both the development of trust and 
degree to which collaboration works. 
Ingrained differences in outlook and culture can inhibit collaboration. 
Collaboration may suffer if such diversity causes “fault lines”—in other words, differences 
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are not understood and addressed.321 Overall, there must be a willingness to accept the 
differences in skills and abilities each discipline provides rather than purely control them. 
Some skilled teams are confident in their abilities to master their known environment 
without assistance. For others, a competitive nature exacerbates a reluctance to change. 
The benefit of building collaboration between SWAT and PSBS is that both disciplines 
exist in the first responder profession, and they already share an underlying culture of crisis 
response and management. Given the disciplines’ shared purpose, the bottom of Table 7 
provides enablers of collaboration vis-à-vis the four categories of diversity—from valuing 
perspectives, to transferring knowledge, to interacting regularly with the other group, to 
communicating openly. In sum, making time to build a relationship while expanding the 
group’s salient identity and shared cognition seems to be the essential enabler.  
B. IMPROVING THE COLLABORATIVE EFFORT 
Groups can leverage collaboration through distinct methods. This section discusses 
these methods individually, but they flow more naturally as an iterative process. 
Socialization can lead to an understanding of overlapping boundary-spanning tasks, and 
better understanding and appreciation of boundary-spanning tasks can help distinct groups 
develop into cross-functional teams. This process describes how SWAT and PSBS might 
leverage collaboration.  
1. Socialization  
Socialization is a fitting first step in moving past the hurdles of collaboration 
between SWAT and PSBS. On the one hand, socialization equates with training potential 
in the first responder profession, and this thesis presents specific opportunities to help 
socialize SWAT and PSBS through joint training. If implemented properly, the joint 
training discussed later addresses the issues of role clarity and knowledge transfer that can 
enable collaboration. Wilson et al. elucidate that more face time with each other will help 
build mutual trust, and it also starts the socialization process.322  
 
321 Edmondson and Roloff, “Overcoming Barriers to Collaboration,” 199. 
322 Wilson et al., “Errors in the Heat of Battle,” 253.  
72 
On the other hand, the social harmony of the in-group can be affected by the 
admittance of an out-group. Such mixing may hinder a new member or group’s 
contribution by alienating newcomers, says Levine, Moreland, and Choi, causing 
apprehension and uncertainty and contributing to an already dim view of collaboration.323 
Thus, some thought must be given before considering collaboration.  
Morehead and Levine provide a socialization model for group development that 
can be helpful, considering the SWAT and PSBS context.324 Their model explains the 
affective, cognitive, and behavioral changes individuals promote throughout a group 
relationship. They have found relationships change over time as individuals move from 
one phase of membership to another. The length of time and quality of experience one has 
within the group affect these phases. Three factors influence the process of socialization.325 
The first is the evaluation process, the assessment of how much one brings to the group to 
achieve its stated goals. The process involves comparing expectations to the actual 
performance of the individual or group being socialized. The second process of 
socialization focuses on commitment, the natural outcome of the evaluation process. It 
examines whether the group feels the newcomer’s intent is genuine and whether the 
newcomer meets expectations. The evaluation and commitment phases are not static—they 
are ongoing and may change over time. The third process of socialization is role transition, 
the changing of one’s expectations and behaviors. In other words, the newcomer 
experiences a passage, leading to further evaluation of commitment and additional role 
transitions. Ultimately, the newcomer becomes an eligible member of the in-group.  
After the evaluation, commitment, and role transition process concludes, 
socialization can truly begin. As shown in Figure 7, socialization is reciprocal.326 
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Figure 7. Phases of Socialization to Membership327 
Figure 7, from Moreland and Levine’s phases of membership, shows how 
socialization can help foster group membership, from pre-socialization (investigation) to 
post-socialization (remembrance).328 Commitment to socialization and a member’s 
transitions through the socialization phases directly relate to time, as time is needed to 
overcome challenges with harmonizing. More time spent on socialization directly relates 
to a more robust development of commitment until divergent attributes affect the 
relationship.329 Figure 7 also shows that as the group maximizes a newcomer’s contribution 
and goal attainment, the newcomer, in turn, strives to change the group through 
accommodation.  
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The socialization phase is a struggle between accommodation and assimilation in 
relation to role negotiation. The newcomer attempts to leverage the group’s contributions 
toward one’s own needs, so she might be an agent of change.330 The socialization process 
enters a maintenance phase as the group continues to accommodate the newcomer and the 
newcomer assimilates to the group. That phase can repeat itself in a cycle, illustrated by a 
re-socialization phase if there is a breakup and then a re-engagement of the team. Evidence 
suggests that groups passing through socialization’s distinct phases have an easier time if 
motivation and an understanding of each other’s valuable skills and abilities are shared and 
appreciated jointly.331  
Pinto et al. delineate three types of group members: new members, full members, 
and marginal members.332 SWAT and PSBS might find themselves in any of these 
categories during Moreland and Levine’s phases of membership.333 While new members 
of a collaborative SWAT/PSBS team might be in the socialization or role transition phase, 
existing members who have completed socialization are likely in the maintenance phase. 
Marginal members might have failed to live up to the group’s expectations or not spent 
enough time with the group to socialize thoroughly.  
Ultimately, if socialization is successful, the group begins to develop shared group 
identity.334 While the opportunity to increase the capacity of knowledge transfer and role 
clarity might be the reward for successful socialization, divergence, frustration, or member 
defection might be the outcome if socialization is not successful.335 In the latter case, older 
group members might question the newcomers’ competency and come to believe the new 
members are trying to change the group dynamic. In turn, the newcomers might question 
their role within the group and their ability to be accepted.  
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Regardless of success, socialization has essential ramifications for group 
development. Newcomers can cause innovation or disrupt the well-established group 
culture. Full membership, as explained by Levine, Moreland, and Choi, “can only be 
attained if the commitment levels of the group and the individual rise to their respective 
acceptance criteria.”336 Thus, membership in a group happens when all members 
experience assimilation and accommodation. Pinto et al. concur, explaining that as 
“membership becomes salient, a positive social identity becomes the ultimate goal of the 
group.”337 With its push and pull of accommodation and assimilation, socialization has the 
additive benefits for SWAT and PSBS of developing trust and better collaboration. New 
knowledge, role clarity, and a greater appreciation for each discipline can be shared and 
integrated for a fuller collaborative venture. Time and forethought to engage the additive 
value of both assimilation and accommodation are needed for socialization to be 
successful. 
2. Boundary-Spanning Cross-Functional Teams  
Proper socialization can help SWAT and PSBS move to the next step. The 
disproportionate number of SWAT and PSBS units nationwide ultimately means that 
SWAT and PSBS units will not always operate in a distinct and defined team. Thus, the 
concept of a cross-functional team (CFT) can apply to better-integrating SWAT and PSBS. 
CFTs, made up of small groups from diverse specialized areas of an organization or 
profession, are considered boundary spanners.338 Unlike distinct groups, CFTs, according 
to Webber, are not static.339 They exist to solve specific situations, and their work together 
may only be on a limited basis. One benefit of CFTs is that “they provide a manageable 
way to bring together diverse resources for a specific project.”340  
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Initially, explain Moreland and Levine, “the levels of trust in these groups may be 
low if group members come from different parts of an organization” or from a different 
agency altogether.341 Successful CFTs engage in effective communication, cooperation, 
and coordination that emerge from a climate of trust. Being a member of a CFT allows for 
the development of ownership, increasing a member’s engagement in getting the job 
done.342 The concept of boundary work and boundary awareness is relatively new in joint 
hazard response, but boundary awareness can improve the attributes of a successful CFT. 
Boundary work refers to the practical tasks performed by certain people or specialized units 
that infrequently interact with other specialized units and work independently of others. 
Boundary spanning, the bridge between two or more independent teams, can help move 
that knowledge around a team through socialization and promote the collective 
understanding of those tasks that interrelate in a broader mission or job. 
As shown in Figure 8, SWAT and PSBS are more likely to operate independently 
of each other in their frequent and common missions, such as warrant service for SWAT 
and responding to suspicious packages for PSBS. However, certain times demand an 
interdependent rather than independent response to overcome a crisis.  
 
Figure 8. Boundary Spanning 
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As the Columbine experience showed, the operations of SWAT and PSBS needed 
to overlap, but they did not. An examination of boundary-spanning tasks is helpful in such 
analysis. Boundary spanning is a tool, described by social scientists, to link one 
organization’s internal resources to another organization’s external resources.343 Tushman 
conducted a study to examine innovation in research and development after World War II. 
He found that collaboration and innovation suffered because of the diffusion and diversity 
of communication, knowledge management, and role ambiguity across boundary lines. 
Siloed cultures tend to be inefficient, and the clarity of roles, knowledge transfer, and 
communication are prone to distortion and distrust. Awareness of boundaries among 
parties could be similar or contradictory, so negotiating those differences within CFTs is 
essential for a collaborative process.344 Andersson suggests a lack of boundary work and 
awareness results in a “silo mentality,” yet a better understanding of boundary lines “is 
important in enhancing organizational resilience.”345 If SWAT and PSBS had a clearer 
understanding of boundary-spanning tasks, their response approach at Columbine might 
not have been siloed.  
The differences between groups and CFTs involve more than structure alone. Cook 
asserts,  
In a [siloed] group, each member is responsible only for their own 
individual contributions. He or she can work in relative isolation without 
too much concern about the other members of the group. . . . Within a 
[siloed] group, there are no shared goals. Each person is responsible for their 
own outcomes. The potential attitude is “I did my bit, it’s up to them how 
they do theirs.”346  
CFTs are different because their members have to be cognizant of their work and how it 
affects other members of the cross-functional group. Interdependence, through shared 
cognition and collective responsibility, overtakes the more independent approach seen in 
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groups alone. Given the diversity among SWAT and PSBS, a focus on establishing a 
SWAT/PSBS CFT has an attractive quality.  
C. CONCLUSION 
Focusing on socialization, mastering boundary spanning, and creating CFTs can 
overcome the challenges to collaboration, such as complacency, practical application, and 
diversity. As suggested by the research examined, each of these approaches improves the 
collaborative effort among diverse groups. The starting point, socialization, has challenges 
to be sure, but though a better understanding of boundary-spanning tasks, a collaborative 
cross-functional SWAT and PSBS model can emerge.  
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Better collaboration between SWAT and PSBS has challenges, to be sure. Each 
discipline is highly specialized, necessitating training and operations that are frequently 
unique to each. Tactical law enforcement units, such as SWAT, handle dangerous armed 
suspects. PSBS handles bombs and other hazardous devices, each high-risk activities. 
Generally, SWAT and PSBS have limited time to work together and cultivate a 
relationship, leading to collaborative challenges during critical joint incident response. If 
the two disciplines are unfamiliar with each other, these fundamental differences further 
impede the teams’ ability to work together. The diffuse nature of SWAT and PSBS 
nationwide exacerbates the challenges of developing trust and collaboration. As seen in the 
literature, overcoming Street’s norms of non-involvement and increasing the frequency of 
encounters are needed to cultivate trust and develop some level of collaboration. 
Trust and collaboration are inextricably linked. The type and level of trust present 
will affect the overall level of collaboration. The failures of SWAT and PSBS collaboration 
at Columbine highlighted gaps that contributed to new forms of joint training and response 
and entry protocols, but arguably not enough to sustain over time. Today, there is at least 
a tacit understanding that SWAT and PSBS need to integrate with boundary-spanning 
tasks. Because of that tacit understanding, collaboration between SWAT and PSBS will 
fall either between swift trust and knowledge-based trust, or knowledge-based trust and 
identification-based trust. Full actualization of identification-based trust is challenging to 
obtain because of the limited time and resources available. However, it is not an impossible 
goal to achieve. Collaboration cultivated by trust can enhance levels of service, reduce 
interagency friction, build organizational collaboration, and prevent or reduce the 
collaborative problems typically seen in the aftermath of a critical incident response.  
This final chapter provides recommendations to formulate better integration 
between SWAT and PSBS. First, the specific joint training examples detailed here will 
cultivate trust and build better collaboration by developing a relationship based on 
competence and confidence. Second, leadership, leadership buy-in, and two models of 
collaborative leadership are examined.  
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A. BRIDGING THE GAP 
Disasters, fortunately, occur infrequently. Their limited occurrence makes it further 
challenging for emergency responders to test and improve response strategies because 
regular day-to-day work is devoted to organizationally specific and independent tasks and 
concerns.347 Mike Wood offers that SWAT and PSBS have a long history of working 
independently. Even though they respond to similar emergencies, they still tend to operate 
as non-integrated teams. In other words, SWAT and PSBS still operate in siloed cultures. 
That model, suggests Wood, may have been more accepted in the past, but the “current 
threat environment demands a closer relationship.”348 Indeed, SWAT and PSBS might still 
operate in silos and adhere to the norms of non-involvement. However, they will not 
operate or collaborate as efficiently or effectively to overcome a joint hazard incident that 
involves guns and bombs. The disciplines have seen the consequences of poor 
collaboration. 
Frequent joint training is valuable, not only for preparing and testing plans and 
equipment but also for maintaining effective crisis management through a robust and 
resilient approach.349 Michael Fahy advocates a one-team strategy, requiring integrated 
training to familiarize members with their expanded capabilities.350 Sean Newman agrees, 
suggesting that the threat environment, including terrorism and all-hazard emergencies, 
calls for a re-thinking of the normal compartmentalized response. When explosives are 
combined with firearms, SWAT and PSBS must do more than coordinate; they must better 
collaborate to prepare for and overcome the challenges they both face.351  
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After-action reviews are one mechanism to document response and identify gaps.352 
A commonly seen recommendation, such as one from the Pulse nightclub massacre, 
suggests holding frequent, or at least routine, joint training.353 Fundamentally, joint training 
has to strike the right balance to properly showcase the skills and abilities of each discipline 
or CFT. Training has to be rooted in reality, and the context of past critical incidents can 
be a guide. An eye to what is required of CFTs must remain in focus.  
Unfortunately, frequent joint training is hampered by the diversity of first 
responders, such as SWAT and PSBS, and a lack of common operational doctrine.354 Thus, 
it becomes challenging to identify problems that would otherwise suggest a need for 
training. When gaps are identified, training might still be neglected because processes are 
not considered and rehearsed to iron out the details. SWAT and PSBS, in this case, would 
not understand and trust the process. They would revert to familiar methods: the bad habits 
of complacency and personal resistance.  
Fear of failing in training is another obstacle to overcome. Training coordinators 
must provide clear, delimited objectives. Too many goals can cloud the training and leave 
it unfocused. Instead, Power offers that training should concentrate “on the development 
of competencies related to teamwork and decision making.”355 A focus on competencies, 
rather than only technical skills, is useful for the development of role clarity, knowledge 
transfer, and mutual trust.356  
How do SWAT and PSBS move past the obstacles to joint training? By developing 
a trans-active memory system (TMS), as suggested by Marques-Quinteiro et al., between 
the two disciplines.357 TMS can develop among team members through shared experiences 
in joint training and a working relationship. Members of a collaborative group then begin 
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to develop shared cognition and implicitly understand tasks that Wilson et al. and Dirks 
and Ferrin offer.358 Group members become responsible and accountable to each other. By 
encouraging role clarity and knowledge transfer, the risk and reluctance involved in 
newcomer socialization diminish. Marques-Quinteiro et al. suggest that collaboration 
happens only when participants have developed TMS.359 Indeed, empirical research shows 
teams, such as SWAT and PSBS, that develop TMS can “coordinate implicitly [and] will 
be better able to adapt performance to non-routine environments.”360  
Both the NTOA and NBSCAB discuss the desire for SWAT and PSBS to 
integrate.361 The NTOA recommends that PSBS integrate at various levels of the SWAT 
mission framework. For Tier 1 SWAT teams, the NTOA recommends an explosive 
breaching capability, PSBS integration for barricaded subject operations (including 
robotics), and PSBS integration for high-risk warrant service that involves explosive device 
and booby trap recognition and mitigation. Furthermore, there is a desire for SWAT and 
PSBS to better collaborate in the overall national homeland security framework. Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive 19 states, “Terrorists have repeatedly shown their 
willingness and ability to use explosives as weapons worldwide, and there is ample 
intelligence to support the conclusion that they will continue to use such devices to inflict 
harm.”362  
The use of explosives in terrorist and non-terrorist incidents alike requires the 
coordination of PSBSs and tactical teams on a deeper level than currently prevails. Both 
SWAT and PSBS must prepare. Landers explains that bomb technicians may need to 
operate with what they can comfortably carry, usually on their person or in a small 
backpack. Bomb technicians, according to Landers, must also move, shoot, and keep up 
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with the tactical team they are tasked to support.363 Draper suggests that tactical teams, 
such as SWAT, should appreciate the real threat that IEDs and booby traps present.364 IEDs 
and booby traps will slow down and impede a tactical team’s movement, and these hazards 
require specialized training, equipment, and time to overcome, defeat, or avoid them. The 
tactical team must know how to integrate a bomb technician’s capabilities. It is equally 
crucial that the bomb technician can operate without being a hindrance to the tactical 
team.365 The following five examples of integrated training opportunities and experiences 
can help promote socialization, build trust, and develop a SWAT/PSBS cross-functional 
team before a crisis occurs. Robotic support, explosive breaching, booby traps, explosive 
awareness, suicide bomber training, and special event planning are examples of specific 
boundary-spanning and CFT training for SWAT and PSBS.  
1. Robotic Support 
An excellent way to start integrated training between SWAT and PSBS involves 
using EOD robotic platforms in barricaded subject calls, a typical SWAT response. Instead 
of putting human lives in danger by entering an unknown environment, a useful tool is a 
robot that can move throughout a structure and record and transmit real-time video that 
reveals the layout of rooms and the location of barricaded and armed subjects. The benefit 
of a PSBS robot is that it has more capabilities than SWAT robots, whose platforms are 
typically smaller and have limited capabilities, a short run time, and few cameras. PSBS 
robots have multiple cameras for a better overall view, and they can manipulate the 
environment by opening doors and moving objects with extendable grippers. They also 
have remote breaching capabilities, which is a force multiplier for officer safety. There are 
drawbacks, however, to using a larger robotic platform as PSBS robots can be slow, but 
 
363 Larry Landers, “Bomb Disposal Support in Tactical Operations,” Detonator, June 2008, 3, 
https://www.iabti.org/uploads/detonator/6.2008-7_Bomb_Disposal_Support_in_Tactical_Operations-_
Larry_Landers.pdf. 
364 Draper, “EOD, Up!,” 73. 
365 Landers, “Bomb Disposal Support in Tactical Operations,” 2. 
84 
they can be overcome by integrated SWAT/PSBS training, thus increasing everyone’s 
familiarity with the enhanced capabilities a PSBS robot offers.366  
Robotic platforms provided a crucial role in response to the Pulse nightclub incident 
in Orlando, Florida. The smaller SWAT tactical robots provided inadequate situational 
awareness inside the nightclub because of the number of obstacles (deceased victims). 
Moreover, they could not locate the hostages and suspect, a crucial need. When the Orange 
County Sheriff Department’s Bomb Squad deployed two PSBS robots into Pulse nightclub, 
the robots navigated obstacles, looked for hostages and the suspect, and manipulated items 
while searching for IEDs and other hazards.367 Finally, the use of PSBS robots at Pulse 
nightclub encouraged SWAT and PSBS to collaborate in the response.  
2. Explosive Breaching  
A second way to integrate SWAT and PSBS is to use bomb technicians as explosive 
breachers in a SWAT element. With the proper application of explosives, SWAT teams 
can force entry into a stronghold position. Breaching and gaining entry is a critical element 
in high-stakes SWAT operations, such as hostage rescue. Other breaching options, 
including ballistic, thermal, and mechanical techniques, also exist. However, explosive 
breaching is the fastest of these options. Explosive breaching must be performed precisely. 
If it is not done right, the technique can be very dangerous.368 
Through their training and experience, bomb technicians already know how to 
handle explosives safely, and they know how to calculate explosive weights and 
overpressure values. These are vital details that keep everyone safe.369 Blast (air) 
overpressure alone accounts for the majority of explosive injuries in an enclosed space, 
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where most explosive breaching occurs.370 The credentials of a bomb technician, given 
their increased training and experience with explosives, can add value to this dangerous 
and sometimes needed skill set. 
3. Booby Trap/Explosive Material Awareness  
A third example of integrated training involves booby trap awareness and 
mitigation. PSBS has specialized training and equipment to help locate, identify, and render 
these hazards safe.371 Awareness-level training can take many forms, but a good starting 
point is for PSBS to familiarize SWAT with the Bomb-Making Materials Awareness 
Program.372 With a better grasp of the real danger of homemade explosives, PSBS could 
provide SWAT with booby trap awareness. Booby traps have been used in various 
scenarios, from terrorism, to the war on drugs, to hostage rescue missions.  
Booby traps are often found in clandestine lab settings, so officers discovering 
marijuana grow facilities or clandestine laboratory operations must be aware of the booby 
trap threat. The booby trap might only be designed to warn the criminal or just impede 
authorities, buying time for the criminal to destroy evidence, escape, or prepare to fight. 
Conversely, the booby trap might be designed to injure or kill.373 A domestic example is 
the aftermath of the Aurora, Colorado, movie theater mass shooting. The attacker’s 
apartment held 30 IEDs, and it was booby-trapped to harm police officers who attempted 
entry.374  
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IEDs and booby traps have also been used worldwide in hostage rescue missions, 
similar to the school takeover in Beslan, Russia.375 Hostage rescue is the most challenging 
work facing domestic SWAT teams. Thus, PSBS would need to work with its assigned 
tactical team to avoid becoming a hindrance during an assault. 
4. Suicide Bomber Training 
Bruce Hoffman explains that suicide attacks are extremely popular with terrorists 
“due to their unique tactical advantage. . . . Suicide tactics are effective and lethal.”376 They 
have a high success rate because suicide bombers are, in effect, smart weapons able to 
change direction and circumvent security measures.377 Suicide bombings are generally 
easier to execute than other attack modes because they are inexpensive and less 
complicated to plan as no escape is needed. Suicide bombers appear quite natural in their 
surroundings; thus, they are powerful psychological weapons, feeding a terrorist group’s 
need to generate fear and insecurity.378  
The use of suicide bombings rose significantly after 9/11, notes Hoffman, with 
some terrorist groups “making it trendy,” promoting the tactic’s diffusion among 
networked terrorist groups.379 Indeed, Horowitz suggests suicide bombings are thought to 
be a “normalized” tactic in the terrorist toolkit, today seen as a legitimate means of 
attacking civilians.380 Although the American experience with suicide bomber attacks in 
the homeland is limited compared to other countries, the United States is not immune. In 
1997, a suicide bomb attack against the New York City subway system was disrupted. A 
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second attack against the same subway system was also foiled in 2009.381 These are just 
two examples.  
Hoffman understands the need to prepare for the eventuality of domestic suicide 
bombings, stating “training is required . . . for law enforcement officers to identify a 
potential suicide bomber, confront a suspect, and to respond and secure the area around the 
attack site in the event of an explosion.”382 If the suicide bomber has exploded or been 
subdued before detonation, tactical units and bomb technicians will need to be summoned 
to help secure the scene and render any hazards safe. Response protocols for suicide 
bombers (and their consequences) are different from traditional police tactics. Such special 
considerations include the possible presence of a suicide bomber handler, a secondary 
device, the need not to move the deceased until he has been cleared of explosive hazards, 
use-of-force issues, and proper scene management. A suicide bomber attack would 
naturally bring together tactical and PSBS assets, so cross-functional training of this type 
is a logical progression for SWAT and PSBS. Response protocols are best determined in 
advance during hands-on training and joint exercises.383  
5. Special Event Planning  
Significant events, much like the Super Bowl, require a sizeable joint hazard 
presence. The Department of Justice prepared a document for planning and managing 
security for major special events, extolling the collaboration and coordination of CFTs 
working together in a joint hazard response.384 Invariably, different professions end up 
operating together. The concept of a strike team can integrate SWAT, PSBS, canine teams, 
tactical medics, and CBRNE specialists in a mobile joint hazard framework.385 The strike 
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team concept provides a great opportunity to iron out integration issues and ample time to 
talk shop with other disciplines, develop a common language, discuss response options, 
and provide a better understanding of each other’s capabilities.386 When Kaszeta integrated 
CFTs during national special events, he “realized a lot of people cared about doing the right 
thing, but no one person or department had the whole answer on how to prepare.”387 In this 
way, the unique needs of special events demand joint teams handle the challenges. 
The five examples of joint training, outlined above, are the major boundary-
spanning activities between SWAT and PSBS. Figure 9 depicts a complete model of 
collaboration between SWAT and PSBS around boundary-spanning activities.  
 
Figure 9. Boundary-Spanning Activities for SWAT and PSBS 
Certain qualities help build effective collaboration. There must be a clearly defined 
and shared purpose, mutual trust and respect, and role clarity. High levels of 
communication are needed between team members.388 Suppose SWAT and PSBS can 
participate in more frequent joint training while concentrating on the boundary-spanning 
activities in Figure 9. In that case, trust can begin to develop, and collaboration has a chance 
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to become more the norm than it is today. Joint training has value, not only for preparing 
and testing plans and equipment but also for maintaining resilient relationships vital in 
crisis management.389 As Andersson notes, a focus on training and interactions in 
boundary-spanning tasks can help CFTs do two things: learn to collaborate and learn 
through collaboration. The former develops boundary work, and the latter builds on 
boundary awareness. Andersson explains that together, both “serve as a foundation for 
understanding how shared responsibilities can be handled.”390  
These boundary-spanning tasks will help develop trust and collaboration between 
SWAT and PSBS before a crisis demands it. Confidence building, problem solving, and 
better role clarity and knowledge transfer will surely benefit. The prize is an increased 
overall response capability for both SWAT and PSBS in the threat environment the United 
States currently faces. 
B. LEADERSHIP 
For collaboration to work, leadership is required. In examining the factors that 
affect leaders during a crisis, Michael Saltz has found that “leaders should establish trusting 
relationships with key partners in advance of a crisis event.”391 Additionally, mutual trust 
should occur not only at the top of a command structure but also at the lower levels.392 This 
section briefly discusses two models—Zaccaro, Heinen, and Shuffler’s model of 
integrative team leadership and effectiveness and Hocevar, Jansen, and Thomas’s inter-
organizational collaborative capacity (ICC) model. This section also discusses conflict, 
which is inevitable in a collaborative effort, because leaders should have an understanding 
of the pitfalls of collaboration to prevent a toxic team environment.  
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1. Leader-Centric vs. Team-Centric Leadership 
Ultimately, the leadership of a SWAT/PSBS cross-functional team will determine 
whether the group has a leader-centric or team-centric outlook. The leader-centric role 
underscores the leader as responsible for shaping the team process and effectiveness. In 
this vertical approach, team members are “treated as mostly passive recipients of the 
leader’s influence. . . . Their primary role is to grant legitimacy to the leader’s exercise of 
power and influence.”393 Individual leadership skills are thus targeted for growth.  
Another perspective is more team-centric in its outlook, involving shared 
leadership.394 The collective has the responsibility of directing and managing a team’s 
efforts. In other words, team processes and effectiveness are shared among the team 
members. Leadership and influence rotate to different individuals, given the skills and 
expertise needed in a particular situation.395 Thus, a systems approach emerges, focusing 
on the team’s leadership skills.  
In reality, both the leader-centric and team-centric approaches can be integrated. 
On the one hand, the chain of command is vital, especially in critical incident response. A 
team’s success or failure ultimately rests on the shoulders of its leadership. Even with a 
team-centric approach, the leader still has the responsibility of leading and managing the 
team and its actions.396 On the other hand, the leader can promote an attitude of team self-
management. The leader’s function would be to staff “the team with members who have 
sufficient levels and diversity of requisite task, teamwork, and leadership skills.”397 The 
leader provides specific expectations for team interaction, and leadership is served by 
allowing the team to develop from within while nurturing a culture of critical thinking.398 
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Disciplines that can provide value to a team’s mission should be consulted and their skills 
and abilities added to the team’s collective. Leaders then coach their teams to achieve the 
overall team’s mission by managing the boundary spanners, promoting interdependent 
relationships, and managing team processes.  
2. Dynamic of Team Interaction 
Zaccaro, Heinen, and Shuffler present a model of integrative team leadership and 
effectiveness with two assumptions. First, capable team leadership manages team 
outcomes by promoting a team’s interdependence and cohesion while helping to reduce 
process loss. Second, a leader’s influence is mediated by a group’s interaction through team 
development, process, and emergent skills. Figure 10 illustrates the relationship between 
team leadership and team interaction. 
 
Figure 10. An Integrative Model of Team Leadership and 
Effectiveness399 
As shown in Figure 10, leadership is the catalyst for team performance, 
adaptability, and viability. To integrate teams into a collaborative enterprise, the leader 
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should account for their bias and minimize the pressure of conformity.400 Maintaining open 
dialogue and accepting different views and opinions is helpful. Moreover, because 
leadership has to be accessible, it ought to encourage and empower team member 
involvement, allowing for constructive feedback while promoting innovation. If a leader 
fails to encourage open dialogue and involvement, he only promotes conformity through 
bias and ego.401 Strong personalities and egos are best left checked at the door or openly 
acknowledged and, if possible, used as a strength in examining issues. 
3. Inter-organizational Collaborative Capacity  
Another research model used to develop teamwork and collaboration is the ICC 
model, developed by Hocevar, Jansen, and Thomas.402 A key assumption of the ICC model 
is that building collaboration requires specific attention to leadership. The ICC model was 
developed to help public-sector agencies, from municipal to federal, achieve collective 
results and support one another in a crisis. Figure 11 defines the ICC model’s five domains.  
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Figure 11. Inter-organizational Collaborative Capacity Model403 
Leaders initially determine the need to collaborate (felt need), and define a purpose 
and strategy for effective collaboration. Resources, personnel, equipment, and time are 
factors to weigh in this process. Established roles (role clarity), including boundary-
spanning roles, must be developed within the structure domain. Known roles become 
involved in the domain of lateral mechanisms, whereby social capital becomes the social 
and professional glue that binds different disciplines and becomes the basis for knowledge 
transfer and trust building. The domain of people, the cornerstone of the ICC model, 
includes the attitudes, behavior, and capabilities that ultimately affect an organization’s 
ability and, more importantly, desire to collaborate.  
A commonality of both the integrated model of team leadership and team 
effectiveness and the ICC model is a focus on shared cognition, as discussed earlier in this 
thesis. In that sense, leaders can help the process by aligning artifacts.404 Artifacts, in one 
context, are usually defined as the visible representation of an organization such as logos 
and branding. However, they can also include the shared stories and values of the 
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organization’s culture, used either to keep an existing culture or to create a new one. 
Leaders play a role in developing a shared identity and creating the “memorable events that 
symbolize the cultural values they want to develop or maintain.”405  
Leadership in a crisis is about “building a foundation of trust among 
stakeholders. . . . Leaders then use that foundation of trust to prepare an organization for 
difficult times.”406 Disagreements will happen, and conflict will occur, but a willingness to 
work toward the collaborative greater good, not just for an individual group, is paramount. 
Fundamentally, the success or failure of building a team rests with the leader who both 
supports and challenges team members by providing a climate of cooperation and a healthy 
respect for the ability to voice differences and appreciate conflict.407 Saying one thing yet 
doing another destroys a leader’s credibility, which in turn can damage a team’s credibility.  
4. Managing Conflict  
While collaborative efforts, such as CFTs, offer tangible benefits to deal with 
complex problems, they are not without challenges.408 Although collaboration is successful 
in establishing “a positive, trusting group climate, based on interpersonal liking and shared 
norms and values,” coordinating activities and contending with competing demands, ideas, 
voices, and opinions of team members may prove challenging.409 Different types of conflict 
affect collaborative effort. Conflict can be both positive and negative—it can be a catalyst 
for innovation or it can lower performance and increase turnover. Sooner or later, conflict 
will negatively affect collaboration, and understanding how to manage it is vital for an 
organization’s health.  
Studies vary on how to respond to a conflict.410 On the one hand, avoiding conflict 
may be a suitable method because ignoring the issue allows the conflict to lose prominence. 
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On the other hand, collaboration (trying to work it out through mutual agreement) and 
contending (imposing or asserting a solution) can either solve the conflict or escalate its 
prominence. Little data exist to show whether either measure is ultimately successful in 
practice. De Dreu and Van Vianen conducted a study that attempted to answer that 
question. They found two types of team conflict exist: relationship conflict and task-related 
conflict. Task-related conflict requires a collaborating response. Instead of being avoided, 
task-related conflict should be confronted. Conversely, relationship conflict should be 
avoided. Fundamentally, developing and maintaining mutual trust is thought to be a 
preventive measure of overall conflict as trust limits the opportunity of task-related 
disagreements from turning into relationship-based conflict. De Dreu and Van Vianen’s 
findings have relevance as they provide leadership with recommendations for managing 
conflicts when they emerge. 
Although relationship conflict might be hard to dissect, task-based conflict is better 
understood. McShane warns, “The main problem with teams is that they have additional 
costs called process losses.”411 Process loss is the cost of time and effort in developing the 
framework for collaboration rather than completing the required tasks.412 Said another way, 
developing collaborative processes and cognition expends time and energy and distracts 
the team from doing the work it was formed to do in the first place. Process loss is typically 
made manifest during the initial collaborative development when new members join or 
through turnover, which disrupts the group’s collective memory.413 Every team that brings 
in new members or expertise will go through this process, but it is up to the leader to 
minimize its disruption to the overall mission.  
Another complaint with collaboration is social or cognitive loafing. When more 
people join a combined effort, other members apply less effort. Social or cognitive loafing 
tends to occur in larger teams when individual performance is harder to evaluate and 
qualify. It also occurs when teams are diverse by location, echoing Edmondson and 
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Roloff’s point. Loafing can be minimized by making team members’ contributions more 
noticeable. Also, loafing is reduced when the task at hand is critical or essential. Team 
members who strongly value the team, and its mission, also help minimize social and 
cognitive loafing.  
Groupthink is also a well-known researched effect of the homogenous nature of 
teams. It is defined as a tendency to ignore alternative courses of action by discounting 
different perspectives.414 Members who offer different perspectives are ostracized, 
punished, or removed. Janis provided the formative work on groupthink in 1972, 
researching its effect on U.S. foreign policy disasters, such as the Bay of Pigs incident, and 
foreign policy successes, such as the Marshall Plan. Janis showed that groupthink occurs 
when group membership and conformity are prized over group outcomes. Other studies 
have found that groupthink does not degrade team performance but has a positive team 
effect, such as increased cohesion.415  
Cohesion is valued, especially in the profession of emergency responders. They 
generally come from similar backgrounds with like values and beliefs, so the promotion of 
discipline could be a positive effect of groupthink. In a study by Ahlfinger and Esser, 
groupthink is presented as an inhibitor of effective teamwork.416 Their results suggest that 
if group leaders push their agendas, teams might exhibit intense symptoms of groupthink. 
In other words, leaders who use their authority to make teams in their image reduce critical 
thinking and suppress dialogue. Questions and inquiries are then perceived as a challenge.  
Groupthink, as recommended by Janis as well as Ricciuti, can be prevented by 
seeking out participation from outside subject-matter experts.417 Any collaborative effort 
should include a culture of open dialogue with the ability to discuss objections and 
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alternative actions. The leader should be impartial and be aware of his or her bias, focusing 
on the scope of the problem and resource availability. Leadership should assign 
independent planning and evaluation groups to work on a single problem. Independent 
planning and evaluation groups should, from time to time, collaborate to iron out 
differences. Outside experts should be included to provide alternative ways to examine 
issues rather than answers for specific skill-related tasks. The role of a devil’s advocate 
within each group should be assigned to provide challenging arguments. Even after a team 
consensus is made, it can provide the ability to raise any lingering doubts before making a 
definitive choice.418  
In sum, leadership has to be open and supportive to influence the outcome of an 
integrated joint hazard response. With an idea of the barriers and pitfalls of collaboration, 
what is needed for SWAT and PSBS collaboration is buy-in from leadership at the local 
and state level, first and foremost. It will be local and state first responders who arrive on 
scene of a critical incident response first. Having leaders with a SWAT and PSBS 
background is paramount to success. Most SWAT missions will not require PSBS 
expertise, but the possibility exists that SWAT will encounter a CBRNE threat or obstacle 
that stops or slows a critical operation. No single job function, posits Keith Johnson, is 
sufficient to respond to complex critical incidents appropriately.419  
C. WHEN COLLABORATION WORKED 
Crisis management has two main approaches: a robust approach and a resilient 
approach. A robust approach is built on “unwanted outcomes and malfunctions from a 
hindsight perspective, and focuses on avoiding these in future responses.”420 A resilient 
approach enables the development of social systems and social capital, such as trust, to 
“proactively adapt to and recover from both expected and unexpected disturbances.”421 The 
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proactive, resilient approach emphasizes a focus on abilities rather than inabilities. Better 
collaboration between SWAT and PSBS before a crisis demand is an example of such a 
resilient approach. The following example of SWAT and PSBS collaboration was 
successful because the ingredients to cultivate trust and enable collaboration were present. 
The author of this paper witnessed these factors firsthand as an active participant. The 
incident also served as the genesis for this thesis.  
On April 29, 2014, before 6:00 a.m., police officers from the Cobb County Police 
Department near Atlanta, Georgia, responded to a FedEx package sorting facility in 
Kennesaw for a shooting. Once officers arrived on the scene, they learned the incident had 
evolved into an active shooter call.  
The 500,000 square foot FedEx sorting facility was a significant distribution site 
for FedEx in north Atlanta. Large 18-wheel tractor-trailers delivered bulk parcels, 
packages, and letters sent from around the world throughout the day. Miles upon miles of 
conveyor belts traversed the facility, racing the packages from the arriving larger trucks to 
smaller trucks destined to make the final deliveries. Hundreds of employees were on hand 
around the clock to help unload, sort, and reload the packages.  
The shooter, 19-year-old Geddy Kramer, was one of the employees. As reported by 
Atlanta Journal-Constitution reporter Alan Judd, he “favored video games set in dystopian 
worlds. He listened to music with angry lyrics. He dabbled with drugs. He desperately 
wanted to have sex. He watched porn on his iPhone. He saw a therapist for depression. He 
grieved, mostly in silence, over his parents’ divorce.”422 
Even though Geddy Kramer had only been four years old when the Columbine 
High School massacre happened, he idolized the attackers.423 Like Klebold and Harris, 
Kramer wanted to attack his high school. “I am the f—ing outcast of the world,” he 
wrote.424 “I’m sick of it. I’m sick of being the weird one. I’m sick of being the one everyone 
 





looks at and laughs. I hate this place. I hate this world.”425 While in school, Kramer wrote, 
“These . . . idiots have no idea what I’m writing. . . . I wish I could kill all of them, but 
there’s just not enough time and so much to do. And, like Dylan Klebold, I think I’ll have 
some followers.”426 
The school shooting did not take place, but Kramer’s attempt to emulate Dylan 
Klebold and Eric Harris came soon enough.427 After high school, he got a job at the FedEx 
distribution center in Kennesaw. After a dispute with his supervisor, Kramer’s troubling 
thoughts returned. Kramer purchased a shotgun and, according to Judd,  
prepared a final checklist for an attack. He broke it down into three 
categories: weapons (the shotgun, four Molotov cocktails, a knife and at 
least and 50 shotgun shells); equipment (including a bandolier for the shells 
and a pouch for carrying the Molotov cocktails); and miscellaneous (one 
item—suicide shell).428 
Police officers quickly arrived on the scene. They were met with a security guard 
who had been shot at the entrance guard shack, other gunshot victims, and numerous 
incendiary IEDs.429 Vehicles, including the shooter’s, soon were deemed suspicious, 
adding further points of concern to investigate. Because of the facility’s size and the 
hazards present, a mutual aid call was transmitted. 
Although the outcome was not as tragic as Columbine, the environment was eerily 
similar: an active shooter, IEDs throughout, multiple victims to rescue, and numerous 
outside jurisdictions and disciplines answering the call to assist. Luckily, the lesson of 
cross-functional collaboration from Columbine was not forgotten; the value of trust and 
collaboration highlighted in this thesis affected the outcome. A good part of the responding 
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Gwinnett County Police, had spent time and effort developing a relationship built on trust 
through dedicated collaborative joint hazard training.  
For years, the Metro-Atlanta PSBSs have been dedicated to a multi-year iterative 
training evolution that has focused on joint collaboration among different jurisdictional 
teams and disciplines. The problems of diversity by way of variety, separation, and 
disparity, as illustrated by Edmondson and Roloff, diminished by developing a shared 
cognitive model and collective identity through role clarity and knowledge transfer. 
Specialized units, such as SWAT and PSBS, have held periodic visits with each other to 
participate in joint training and team building. Through a multi-year training evolution, 
local PSBS and SWAT units became more socialized, and the barriers to trust, such as 
group competition and group identity and cultural variances, began to diminish. The 
exogenous team process of Power and Alison’s taxonomy of uncertainty was addressed as 
communication and role understanding improved. The gap of trust shrunk.  
The promoters of trust, as outlined in this thesis—communication, coordination, 
and cooperation—were prioritized to develop competencies and confidence in each other’s 
abilities. As role clarity improved, SWAT and PSBS began to realize they could assist each 
other more. The assertion of “I did my bit; it is up to them know”—a common in-group/out-
group trope—has become “How do we solve this?” A lack of trust, the greatest barrier to 
collaboration, as observed in Hocevar, Jansen, and Thomas’s study, was thus overcome.  
The trust developed and maintained by the Metro-Atlanta PSBS community before 
the crisis had a positive effect at the FedEx incident through relationship building and joint 
training. The trust surpassed calculus- and knowledge-based trust and transformed into 
identification-based trust. Lewicki and Bunker’s point that mutual understanding and trust 
form the basis of identification-based trust was on exhibit. A salient common identification 
increased the opportunity for collaboration. Covey’s four qualities of trust—integrity, 
intent, capabilities, and results—connected.  
Trust played another role. It transferred from the PSBS community to the on-scene 
commanders making decisions through the Incident Command System. Trust, thus, proved 
Moynihan correct; it was indeed an indispensable complement to ICS. Regular joint skill 
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training helped to build relationships, which led to the development of identification-based 
trust. PSBS and SWAT teams, even from other jurisdictions, overcame the ambiguity of 
credibility and risk that tends to hamper effective collaboration. When Atlanta and 
Gwinnett PSBSs arrived at the scene, they were not left idle and siloed. Both PSBSs were 
quickly integrated into the response, thus producing a better collaborative effort to meet 
the environment’s demands. PSBS, bomb detection dog teams, and SWAT elements were 
joined, producing CFTs to completely clear the facility and identify and mitigate hazards 
while searching for victims yet unaccounted.  
The after-action report noted the one-team approach: “The cooperation and 
teamwork among various agencies to complete the critical tasks at hand was simply 
amazing.”430 That statement, made by the incident commander at the FedEx shooting, is 
unusually strong praise for a typical after-action report. Furthermore, that observation 
corresponds with research by Milica Stojmenovic and Gitte Lindgaard, whose 2013 social 
network analysis of emergency responders highlights the following salient point.431 
Management of such critical incidents as domestic terrorist events and active shooters is 
reinforced by mutual trust developed by cultivating and maintaining relationships and 
pressure testing any collaborative effort through frequent boundary-spanning joint 
training.432  
Stojmenovic and Lindgaard’s findings correlate with Moynihan’s study on network 
governance of crisis response. Through a case study analysis, Moynihan determined “a 
durable basis for trust during crises is positive precrisis working relationships . . . [and] 
creating and ensuring the continuity of interorganizational liaisons who act as boundary 
spanners.”433 Both Stojmenovic and Lindgaard’s and Moynihan’s points were on display 
during the FedEx incident in Cobb County, Georgia. The incident commander’s actions 
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and statements also highlight how leadership buy-in is crucial for any collaborative 
enterprise. Ultimately, identification-based trust and a willingness of leadership to 
collaborate were made manifest at the FedEx active shooter incident. 
Integrating SWAT and PSBS boundary-spanning training and operations does not 
mean that SWAT teams learn how to disarm explosive devices or make booby traps safe, 
nor does it mean that PSBSs have become experts in close-quarter combat. It is important 
that SWAT and PSBS overcome the norms of non-involvement and spend time training 
with each other to cultivate trust and a TMS through an understanding of capabilities and 
roles before a crisis occurs. Integrating PSBS with specific tasks into SWAT enhances 
everyone’s skillset. This shared knowledge promotes trust, builds confidence and 
credibility, expands relationships, and improves the team’s overall capability through 
better collaboration.  
In his book One Mission, Chris Fussell showcases the concept of integration in a 
joint hazard response framework by way of one simple equation: “Credibility = Proven 
Competence + Integrity + Relationship.” Similarly, collaboration is the tapestry of a 
conversation, begun by making a connection, establishing trust, and starting a relationship. 
As Fussell expresses, the emphasis must be on “relationships over mission, trust over 




434 Chris Fussell, One Mission (New York: Penguin Publishing, 2017), loc. 1135 of 5927, Kindle. 
103 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Adcock, J. D. Cobb County Police Department Incident Synopsis and Debrief: Multi-
Jurisdictional Response to Active Shooter Incident, FedEx Aggravated Assault, 
April 29, 2014. Marietta, GA: Cobb County Police Department, 2014. 
Andersson, Annika. “In Case of Emergency: Collaboration Exercises at the Boundaries 
between Emergency Service Organizations.” PhD diss., University West, 2016. 
http://hv.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:924967/FULLTEXT01.pdf. 
Berger, J. M. Extremism. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2018. 
Bhattacharjee, Yudhijit. “The Curse of the White Powder: How Fake Bioterrorism 
Attacks Became a Real Problem.” Slate, January 30, 2012. https://slate.com/
technology/2012/01/white-powder-hoaxes-a-trend-in-fake-terrorism.html. 
CBS Atlanta. “Bomb Tech Hazmat Training.” April 3, 2019. Video, 2:35. https://www.
cbs46.com/bomb-tech-hazmat-training/video_a673915d-876c-545d-a9bf-5700
eddeed5d.html. 
Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency. “Bomb-Making Materials Awareness 
Program (BMAP).” November 8, 2019. https://www.cisa.gov/bmap. 
Brandley, Paul. “Explosive Entry.” Tactical Response 4, no. 8 (April 2006): 73–77. 
Brannan, David W., Anders Strindberg, and Kristin M. Darken. A Practitioner’s Way 
Forward: Terrorism Analysis. Salinas, CA: Agile Press, 2014. 
Branscombe, Nyla R., Daniel L. Wann, Jeffrey G. Noel, and Jason Coleman. “In-Group 
or Out-Group Extremity: Importance of the Threatened Social Identity.” 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 19, no. 4 (1993): 381–88. https://doi.
org/10.1177/0146167293194003. 
Bundy, Edwin, and Roderick Sims. “Commonalities in an Uncommon Profession: Bomb 
Disposal.” In Proceedings of the 2007 Australasian Society for Computers in 
Learning in Tertiary Education, 85–95. Queensland: ASCILITE, 2007. 
https://www.ascilite.org/conferences/singapore07/procs/bundy.pdf.  
Burch, Audra D. S., and Alan Blinder. “Parkland Officer Who Stayed Outside during 
Shooting Faces Criminal Charges.” New York Times, June 4, 2019. https://www.
nytimes.com/2019/06/04/us/parkland-scot-peterson.html. 
Cashman, John R. “The Massacre at Columbine High School.” In Emergency Response 
Handbook for Chemical and Biological Agents and Weapons, 2nd ed., 45–58. 
Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1201/9781420052664. 
104 
Champion, Howard R., John B. Holcomb, and Lee Ann Young. “Injuries from 
Explosions: Physics, Biophysics, Pathology, and Required Research Focus.” 
Journal of Trauma: Injury, Infection, and Critical Care 66, no. 5 (May 2009): 
1468–77. https://doi.org/10.1097/ta.0b013e3181a27e7f. 
Choi, Jin Nam, and Myung Un Kim. “The Organizational Application of Groupthink and 
Its Limitations in Organizations.” Journal of Applied Psychology 84, no. 2 (1999): 
297–306. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.84.2.297. 
Connors, Edward. Planning and Managing Security for Major Special Events: Guidelines 
for Law Enforcement. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Police 
Services, 2007. https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=482649. 
Cook, Sarah. Building a High-Performance Team: Proven Techniques for Effective Team 
Working. Cambridgeshire, UK: IT Governance Publishing, 2009. ProQuest. 
Cooper, Cary L. “Personality Characteristics of Successful Bomb Disposal Experts.” 
Journal of Occupational Medicine 24, no. 9 (September 1982): 653–55. 
https://doi.org/10.1097/00043764-198209000-00009. 
Courtois, Pierre, and Tarik Tazdaït. “Learning to Trust Strangers: An Evolutionary 
Perspective.” Journal of Evolutionary Economics 22, no. 2 (April 2012): 367–83. 
http://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-011-0247-z. 
Covey, Stephen M. R. The Speed of Trust: The One Thing That Changes Everything. 
New York: Free Press, 2006. 
Curnin, Steven, Christine Owen, Douglas Paton, and Benjamin Brooks. “A Theoretical 
Framework for Negotiating the Path of Emergency Management Multi-Agency 
Coordination.” Applied Ergonomics 47 (March 2015): 300–307. https://doi.org/
10.1016/j.apergo.2014.10.014. 
Curnin, Steven, Christine Owen, Douglas Paton, Cain Trist, and David Parsons. “Role 
Clarity, Swift Trust and Multi‐Agency Coordination.” Journal of Contingencies 
and Crisis Management 23, no. 1 (2015): 29–35. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-
5973.12072. 
Das, T. K., and Bing-Sheng Teng. “The Risk-Based View of Trust: A Conceptual 
Framework.” Journal of Business and Psychology 19, no. 1 (Fall 2004): 85–116. 
https://doi.org/10.1023/B:JOBU.0000040274.23551.1b. 
Dasgupta, Partha. “Trust as a Commodity.” In Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative 




Day, Dwayne C. “A Uniform Approach to National Suicide Bomber Incident Response 
and Recovery.” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008. http://hdl.
handle.net/10945/4254. 
De Dreu, Carsten K. W., and Annelies E. M. Van Vianen. “Managing Relationship 
Conflict and the Effectiveness of Organizational Teams.” Journal of 
Organizational Behavior 22, no. 3 (May 2001): 309–28. 
Dirks, Kirk T., and Donald L. Ferrin. “The Role of Trust in Organizational Settings.” 
Organization Science 12, no. 4 (August 2001): 450–67. 
Donahue, Amy K., and Robert V. Tuohy. “Lessons We Don’t Learn: A Study of the 
Lessons of Disasters, Why We Repeat Them, and How We Can Learn Them.” 
Homeland Security Affairs 2, no. 2 (July 2006): 1–28. 
Draper, Stephen R. “‘EOD, Up!’ How Explosive Ordnance Disposal Forces Can Best 
Support Special Operations Forces.” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
2006. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/2758. 
Dulin, Adam. “Special Weapons and Tactics Teams.” TELEMASP Bulletin 12, no. 3 
(June 2005): 1–10. ProQuest. 
Edmondson, Amy C., and Kathryn S. Roloff. “Overcoming Barriers to Collaboration: 
Psychological Safety and Learning in Divers Teams.” In Team Effectiveness in 
Complex Organizations: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives and Approaches, edited 
by Eduardo Salas, Gerald F. Goodwin, and C. Shawn Burke, 183–208. New York: 
Taylor & Francis, 2009. 
Edwards, Erin. “FBI Holding Special Tactical Bomb Training in Myrtle Beach.” NBC 
News Myrtle Beach, August 15, 2018. https://www.wmbfnews.com/story/
37833533/fbi-holding-special-tactical-bomb-training-in-myrtle-beach. 
Eligon, John, and Marc Santora. “Police at Home of Colorado Suspect Disarm Major 
Threats.” New York Times, July 21, 2012. https://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/22/
us/colorado-movie-theater-shooting-james-holmes.html. 
Executive Office of the President. Combating Terrorist Use of Explosives in the United 
States. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 19. Washington, DC: White 
House, February 12, 2007. https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=471864. 
Fahy, Michael J. “Understanding Swift Trust to Improve Interagency Collaboration in 
New York City.” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012. http://hdl.
handle.net/10945/17362. 
Federal Bureau of Investigation. “Inside the FBI’s Hazardous Devices School.” January 
9, 2018. https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/hazardous-devices-school. 
106 
———. Preface to A Model for Bomb Squad Standard Operating Procedures. Special 
Technicians Bulletin 2010-1. Washington, DC: Department of Justice, 2010. 
Federal Emergency Management Agency. ICS-300: Intermediate ICS for Expanding 
Incidents Student Manual. Washington, DC: FEMA, 2012. 
———. Typed Resource Definitions: Law Enforcement and Security Resources. FEMA 
508-6. Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2005. 
https://www.fema.gov/doc/emergency/nims/508-6_Law_Enfor_Secur_Resources.
doc. 
Forensic Magazine. “Inside the FBI’s Hazardous Devices School.” January 10, 2018. 
ProQuest. 
French, Glenn. “Breaching: Which Option Is Best for Your Team?” Police1, September 
2, 2018. https://www.police1.com/police-products/tactical/tactical-entry-tools/
articles/breaching-which-option-is-best-for-your-team-93B5EuCp5IHv95c1/.  
Fussell, Chris. One Mission. New York: Penguin Publishing, 2017. Kindle. 
Gambetta, Diego. “Can We Trust Trust?” In Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative 
Relationships, edited by Diego Gambetta, 213–37. Cambridge, MA: Basil 
Blackwell, 1988. https://www.nuffield.ox.ac.uk/users/gambetta/Trust_making%
20and%20breaking%20cooperative%20relations.pdf. 
———, ed. Forward to Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations. Cambridge, 
MA: Basil Blackwell, 1988. https://www.nuffield.ox.ac.uk/users/gambetta/Trust_
making%20and%20breaking%20cooperative%20relations.pdf. 
Glicksohn, Joseph, and Menahem Bozna. “Developing a Personality Profile of the Bomb-
Disposal Expert: The Role of Sensation Seeking and Field Dependence and 
Independence.” Personality and Individual Differences 28, no. 1 (January 2000): 
85–92. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0191-8869(99)00083-5. 
Higuchi, Darrell D. “Model Procedures for Responding to a Package with Suspicion of a 
Biological Threat.” International Fire Chiefs Association, October 17, 2001. 
https://www.iafc.org/topics-and-tools/resources/resource/model-procedures-for-
responding-to-a-package-with-suspicion-of-a-biological-threat. 
Hocevar, Susan, Erik Jansen, and Gail Fann Thomas. Building Collaborative Capacity 
for Homeland Security. NPS-GSBPP-04-008. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/571. 
———. Inter-organizational Collaborative Capacity (ICC) Assessment. Monterey, CA: 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/38477. 
Hoffman, Bruce. Inside Terrorism. 3rd ed. New York: Columbia University Press, 2017. 
107 
Horowitz, Michael C. “The Rise and Spread of Suicide Bombing.” Annual Review of 
Political Science 18 (2015): 69–84. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-
062813-051049. 
Huemer, Lars. “Creating Cooperative Advantage: The Roles of Identification, Trust, and 
Time.” Industrial Marketing Management 43, no. 4 (May 2014): 564–72. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.indmarman.2014.02.011. 
Hyllengren, Peder, Gerry Larsson, Maria Fors, Misa Sjöberg, Jarle Eid, and Olav 
Kjellevold Olsen. “Trust at First Sight: Swift Trust in Leaders in Temporary 
Military Groups.” Team Performance Management 17, no. 7/8 (2011): 354–68. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/13527591111182625. 
International Association of Chiefs of Police and National Tactical Officers Association. 
National Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Study: A National Assessment of 
Critical Trends and Issues from 2009 to 2013. Alexandria, VA: International 
Association of Chiefs of Police, 2014. https://ntoa.org/pdf/swatstudy.pdf. 
James, Erika H., and Lynn P. Wooten. Leading under Pressure: From Surviving to 
Thriving Before, During, and After a Crisis. New York: Taylor & Francis, 2010. 
Janis, Irving Lester. Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy 
Decisions and Fiascoes. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972. 
Janssen, Marijn, Jinkyu Lee, Nitesh Bharosa, and Anthony Cresswell. “Advances in 
Multi-Agency Disaster Management: Key Elements in Disaster Research.” 
Information Systems Frontiers 12, no. 1 (March 2010): 1–7. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1007/s10796-009-9176-x. 
Jensen, Jessica, and William L. Waugh. “The United States’ Experience with the Incident 
Command System: What We Think We Know and What We Need to Know More 
About.” Journal of Contingencies & Crisis Management 22, no. 1 (March 2014): 
5–17. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5973.12034. 
Jernigan, David K. “Hazardous Devices School.” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, August 
2006. ProQuest. 
Johnson, Keith H. “Changing the Paradigm: Implementation of Combined Law 
Enforcement, Fire, and Emergency Medical Service (EMS) Cross-Disciplinary 
Response to Hostile Events.” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2014. 
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/44587. 
Jones, Tony. “Booby Traps 101.” Law & Order 49, no. 3 (2001): 82–86. 
Judd, Alan. “An American Teenager.” Atlanta Journal-Constitution. Accessed October 
24, 2020. https://investigations.ajc.com/fedex-shooter/. 
108 
Kaszeta, Dan. CBRN and Hazmat Incidents at Major Public Events Planning and 
Response. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2013. 
Kautt, Glenn. “How to Build Trust.” Financial Planning 45, no. 3 (2015): 29. ProQuest. 
Klimoski, Richard J., and Barbara L. Karol. “The Impact of Trust on Creative Problem 
Solving Groups.” Journal of Applied Psychology 61, no. 5 (October 1976): 630–
33. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.61.5.630. 
Klinger, David, and Jeff Rojek. Multi-Method Study of Police Special Weapons and 
Tactics Teams. NCJ 223855. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, 2008.  
Kramer, Roderick M., and Tom R. Tyler, ed. Trust in Organizations: Frontiers of Theory 
and Research. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 1996. 
Kraskaa, Peter B., and Derek J. Paulsenb. “Grounded Research into U.S. Paramilitary 
Policing: Forging the Iron Fist inside the Velvet Glove.” Policing and Society 7, 
no. 4 (1997): 253–70. https://doi.org/10.1080/10439463.1997.9964777. 
Landers, Larry. “Bomb Disposal Support in Tactical Operations.” Detonator, June 2008. 
https://www.iabti.org/uploads/detonator/6.2008-7_Bomb_Disposal_Support_
in_Tactical_Operations-_Larry_Landers.pdf. 
Levin, Daniel Z., and Rob Cross. “The Strength of Weak Ties You Can Trust: The 
Mediating Role of Trust in Effective Knowledge Transfer.” Management Science 
50, no. 11 (2004): 1477–90. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1030.0136. 
Levine, John M., Richard L. Moreland, and Hoon-Seok Choi. “Group Socialization and 
Newcomer Innovation.” In Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology: Group 
Processes, edited by Michael A. Hogg and R. Scott Tindale, 86–106. Malden, 
MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2001. 
Lewicki, Roy J., and Barbara Benedict Bunker. “Developing and Maintaining Trust in 
Work Relationships.” In Trust in Organizations: Frontiers of Theory and 
Research, edited by Roderick M. Kramer and Tom R. Tyler, 114–39. Thousand 
Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 1996. http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781452243610.
n7. 
Lewicki, Roy J., Daniel J. McAllister, and Robert J. Bies. “Trust and Distrust: New 
Relationships and Realities.” Academy of Management Review 23, no. 3 (July 
1998): 438–58. https://doi.org/10.5465/AMR.1998.926620. 
Lewicki, Roy J., Edward C. Tomlinson, and Nicole Gillespie. “Models of Interpersonal 
Trust Development: Theoretical Approaches, Empirical Evidence, and Future 
Directions.” Journal of Management 32, no. 6 (2006): 991–1022. https://doi.
org/10.1177/0149206306294405. 
109 
Luhmann, Niklas. “Familiarity, Confidence, Trust: Problems and Alternatives.” In Trust: 
Making and Breaking Cooperative Relationships, edited by Diego Gambetta, 94–
104. Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1988. https://www.nuffield.ox.ac.uk/
users/gambetta/Trust_making%20and%20breaking%20cooperative%20relations.
pdf. 
Lundberg, Carl, and Henrik I. Christensen. “Assessment of Man-Portable Robots for Law 
Enforcement Agencies.” In Proceedings of the 2007 Workshop on Performance 
Metrics for Intelligent Systems. Gaithersburg, MD: National Institute of Standards 
and Technology, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1145/1660877.1660887.  
Marques-Quinteiro, P., L. Curral, A. Passos, and K. Lewis. “And Now What Do We Do? 
The Role of Transactive Memory Systems and Task Coordination in Action 
Teams.” Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice 17, no. 3 (2013): 194–
206. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0033304. 
Mayer, Roger C., James H. Davis, and F. David Schoorman. “An Integrative Model of 
Organizational Trust.” Academy of Management Review 20, no. 3 (July 1995): 
709–34. https://doi.org/10.5465/AMR.1995.9508080335. 
McShane, Steven Lattimore, and Mary Ann Young Von Glinow. Organizational 
Behavior: Essentials. 2nd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2009. 
Med-Eng Holdings. “EOD 10 Suit & Helmet.” Accessed February 22, 2020. 
https://www.med-eng.com/product/eod-10-suit-helmet/. 
Meyerson, Debra, Karl Weick, and Roderick Kramer. “Swift Trust and Temporary 
Groups.” In Trust in Organizations: Frontiers of Theory and Research, edited by 
Roderick K. Kramer and Tom R. Tyler, 166–95. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE 
Publications, 1996. 
Mishra, Aneil. “Organizational Responses to Crisis: The Centrality of Trust.” In Trust in 
Organizations: Frontiers of Theory and Research, edited by Roderick K. Kramer 
and Tom R. Tyler, 261–87. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 1996. 
Moreland, Richard L., and John M. Levine. “Building Bridges to Improve Theory and 
Research on Small Groups.” In Team Effectiveness in Complex Organizations: 
Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives and Approaches, edited by Eduardo Salas, 
Gerald F. Goodwin, and C. Shawn Burke, 17–38. New York: Taylor & Francis, 
2009. 
———. “Socialization and Trust in Work Groups.” Group Processes & Intergroup 
Relations 5, no. 3 (2002): 185–201. https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430202
005003001. 
110 
———. “Socialization in Small Groups: Temporal Changes in Individual-Group 
Relationships.” Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 15 (1982): 137–92. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60297-X. 
Moynihan, Donald. “The Network Governance of Crisis Response: Case Studies of 
Incident Command Systems.” Journal of Public Administration Research and 
Theory 19, no. 4 (2009): 895–915. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mun033. 
National Bomb Squad Commanders Advisory Board. National Guidelines for Bomb 
Technicians. Washington, DC: Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2016. 
———. National Strategic Plan of U.S. Bomb Squads. Huntsville, AL: National Bomb 
Squad Commanders Advisory Board, 2018. 
National Tactical Officers Association. Tactical Response and Operations Standards for 
Law Enforcement Agencies. Colorado Springs: National Tactical Officers 
Association, 2018. 
Newman, Sean S. “Braving the Swarm: Lowering Anticipated Group Bias in Integrated 
Fire/Police Units Facing Paramilitary Terrorism.” Master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/5803. 
Pinto, Isabel R., José M. Marques, John M. Levine, and Dominic Abrams. “Membership 
Status and Subjective Group Dynamics: Who Triggers the Black Sheep Effect?” 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 99, no. 1 (July 2010): 107–19. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0018187. 
Power, Nicola. “Extreme Teams: Toward a Greater Understanding of Multiagency 
Teamwork during Major Emergencies and Disasters.” American Psychologist 73, 
no. 4 (2018): 478–90. https://doi.org/10.1037/amp0000248. 
Power, Nicola, and Laurence Alison. “Redundant Deliberation about Negative 
Consequences: Decision Inertia in Emergency Responders.” Psychology, Public 
Policy, and Law 23, no. 2 (May 2017): 243–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/law
0000114. 
Ricciuti, James E. “Groupthink: A Significant Threat to the Homeland Security of the 
United States.” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2014. http://hdl.
handle.net/10945/44650. 
Richardson, Noni, and James Esser. “Testing the Groupthink Model: Effects of 
Promotional Leadership and Conformity Predisposition.” Social Behavior and 
Personality 29, no. 1 (2001): 31–41. https://doi.org/10.2224/sbp.2001.29.1.31. 
Rieley, James B. “Overcoming the Barriers to Effective Collaboration.” Global Business 
& Organizational Excellence 33, no. 3 (2014): 37–45. https://doi.org/10.1002/joe.
21542. 
111 
Rosegrant, Susan. “The Shootings at Columbine High School: Responding to a New 
Kind of Terrorism: Sequel.” C16-01-1612.1. Cambridge, MA: Kennedy School of 
Government, Harvard University, 2001. 
Rotter, Julian B. “A New Scale for the Measurement of Interpersonal Trust.” Journal of 
Personality 35, no. 4 (December 1967): 651–65. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
6494.1967.tb01454.x. 
Rousseau, Denise, Sim Sitkin, Ronald Burt, and Colin Camerer. “Not So Different After 
All: A Cross-Discipline View of Trust.” Academy of Management Review 23, no. 
3 (July 1998): 393–404. https://doi.org/10.5465/AMR.1998.926617. 
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. “Russia: Independent Beslan Investigation Sparks 
Controversy.” August 29, 2006. https://www.rferl.org/a/1070905.html. 
Saltz, Michael E. “Crisis Leadership and Complex Crises: A Search for Competencies.” 
Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/
56798. 
Schlenker, Barry R., Bob Helm, and James T. Tedeschi. “The Effects of Personality and 
Situational Variables on Behavioral Trust.” Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 25, no. 3 (March 1973): 419–27. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0034088. 
Schneier, Bruce. “The Army in Our Midst.” Wall Street Journal, August 6, 2013. 
Schumacher, Steve. “Personality Differences.” Rock Products, April 2009. ProQuest. 
Sitkin, Sim B., and Nancy L. Roth. “Explaining the Limited Effectiveness of Legalistic 
‘Remedies’ for Trust/Distrust.” Organization Science 4, no. 3 (August 1993): 
367–92. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.4.3.367. 
Smart, Kim, and Carol Barnum. “Communication in Cross-Functional Teams: An 
Introduction to This Special Issue.” Technical Communication 47, no. 1 (2000): 
19–21. 
Spahr, Lisa L., Joshua Ederheimer, and David Bilson. Patrol Level Response to a Suicide 
Bomb Threat: Guidelines for Consideration. Washington, DC: Police Executive 
Research Forum, 2007. 
Stinchcomb, Jeanne, and Francisco Ordaz. “The Integration of Two ‘Brotherhoods’ into 
One Organizational Culture: A Psycho-Social Perspective on Merging Police and 
Fire Services.” Public Organization Review 7, no. 2 (2007): 143–61. https://doi.
org/10.1007/s11115-006-0026-8. 
112 
Stojmenovic, Milica, and Gitte Lindgaard. “Benefits and Limitations of the Social 
Network Analysis When Explaining Instances of Ineffective Communication in 
Two Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives Simulations.” 
Paper presented at the 2013 International Conference on Cloud and Green 
Computing, Karlsruhe, Germany, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1109/CGC.2013.58. 
Straub, Frank, Jack Cambria, Jane Castor, Ben Gorban, Brett Meade, David Waltemeyer, 
and Jennifer Zeunik. Rescue, Response, and Resilience: A Critical Incident 
Review of the Orlando Public Safety Response to the Attack on the Pulse 
Nightclub. Washington DC: Office of Community Oriented Police Services, 2017. 
https://cops.usdoj.gov/RIC/Publications/cops-w0857-pub.pdf. 
Street, Warren R. “Brainstorming by Individuals, Coaching and Interacting Groups.” 
Journal of Applied Psychology 59, no. 4 (1974): 433–36. https://doi.org/10.
1037/h0037273. 
Tajfel, Henri, ed. Social Identity and Intergroup Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010. 
TechBeat. “Bomb Squads: Local Preparedness for Global Problems.” Winter 2010. 
Townley, Cynthia, and Jay L. Garfield. “Public Trust.” In Trust: Analytic and Applied 
Perspectives, edited by Pekka Mäkelä and Cynthia Townley, 95–106. 
Amsterdam: Brill, 2013. ProQuest. 
Tushman, Michael L. “Special Boundary Roles in the Innovation Process.” 
Administrative Science Quarterly 22, no. 4 (1977): 587–605. https://doi.org/10.
2307/2392402. 
U.S. Bomb Data Center. 2018 Explosives Incident Report. Redstone Arsenal, AL: U.S. 
Bomb Data Center, 2018. https://www.atf.gov/file/136971/download. 
U.S. Fire Administration. Wanton Violence at Columbine High School: Littleton, 
Colorado. USFA-TR-12. Emmitsburg, MD: Department of Homeland Security, 
1999. https://www.usfa.fema.gov/downloads/pdf/publications/tr-128.pdf. 
Webb, Eugene J. “Trust and Crisis.” In Trust in Organizations: Frontiers of Theory and 
Research, edited by Robert M. Kramer and Tom R. Tyler, 288–301. Thousand 
Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 1996. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781452243610. 
Webber, Sheila Simsarian. “Leadership and Trust Facilitating Cross-Functional Team 
Success.” Journal of Management Development 21, no. 3 (2002): 201–14. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/02621710210420273. 
Westcott, Jeffrey. “Super Bowl XXXIX: The Successful Response of the FBI and Its 
Partners.” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, January 2006. 
113 
Williams, George. “Ambush Prevention: Develop Better Habits.” Tactical Response 11, 
no. 6 (2013). 
Wilson, Katherine A., Eduardo Salas, Heather A. Priest, and Dee Andrews. “Errors in the 
Heat of Battle: Taking a Closer Look at Shared Cognition Breakdowns through 
Teamwork.” Human Factors 49, no. 2 (2007): 243–56. https://doi.org/10.1518/
001872007X312478. 
Wood, Mike. “Improving the Bomb Squad and SWAT Partnership.” Police1, September 
17, 2019. https://www.police1.com/swat/articles/improving-the-bomb-squad-and-
swat-partnership-qPcjn12bw5HVW238/.  
Young, Andrew T., Chris Hennington, and Dane Eggleston. “US SWAT Operator 
Experience, Personality, Cognitive-Emotion Regulation and Decision-Making 
Style.” Policing 41, no. 2 (2018): 247–261. https://doi.org/10.1108/PIJPSM-10-
2016-0156. 
Young Pecko, Paula L. “Complacency: A Threat to Homeland Security?” Master’s thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/42760. 
Zaccaro, Stephen J., Beth Heinen, and Marissa Shuffler. “Team Leadership and Team 
Effectiveness.” In Team Effectiveness in Complex Organizations: Cross-
Disciplinary Perspectives and Approaches, edited by Eduardo Salas, Gerald F. 
Goodwin, and C. Shawn Burke, 83–112. New York: Taylor & Francis, 2009. 
Ziller, Robert C. “Toward a Theory of Open and Closed Groups.” Psychological Bulletin 
64, no. 3 (September 1965): 164–82. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0022390. 
Zolin, Roxanne. “Swift Trust in Hastily Formed Networks.” Monterey, CA: Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2002. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/36757. 
  
114 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
115 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
